Yearly Archives: 2012

By The Theory’s Originators, At Any Rate

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While most people – including most economists – treat money as a commodity, there are some who understand the endogeneity of money. However, there is a degree of endogeneity assigned to the nature of money with some thinking money was a commodity in some periods in history. So one sees claims that what is written in economics textbooks works only in “gold standard” or worse – fixed exchange rate regimes. Fixed or floating is not the focus of this post, but I’d like to quote James Tobin who once said:

I believe that the basic problem today is not the exchange rate regime, whether fixed or floating. Debate on the regime evades and obscures the essential problem.

… The man and his wisdom 🙂

Nicholas Kaldor wrote a major article in 1985 titled How Monetarism Failed (Challenge, Vol. 28, No. 2, link). The article goes into the heart of confusions in economists’ minds on the nature of money.

Kaldor talks about the Monetarists’ false intuition:

Given the fact that the demand for money represents a stable function of incomes (or expenditures), Friedman and his associates conclude that any increase in the supply of money, however brought about (for ex- ample, through open-market operations that lead to the substitution of cash for short-term government debt in the hands of discount houses or other financial institutions), will imply that the supply of money will exceed the demand at the prevailing level of incomes (people will “find themselves” with more money than they wish to hold). This defect, in their view, will be remedied, and can only be remedied, by an increase in expenditures that will raise incomes sufficiently to eliminate the excess of supply over the demand for money.

As a description of what happens in a modern economy, and as a piece of reasoning applied to situations where money consists of “credit money” brought about by the creation of public or private debt, this is a fallacious piece of reasoning. It is an illegitimate application of the original propositions of the quantity theory of money, which (by the theory’s originators at any rate) were applied to situations in which money consisted of commodities, such as gold or silver, where the total quantity in existence could be regarded as exogenously given at any one time as a heritage of the past; and where sudden and unexpected increases in supply could occur (such as those following the Spanish conquest of Mexico), the absorption of which necessitated a fall in the value of the money commodity relative to other commodities. Until that happened, someone was always holding more gold (or silver) than he desired, and since all the gold (and silver) that is anywhere must be somewhere, the total quantity of precious metals to be held by all money-users was independent of the demand for it. The only way supply could be brought into conformity, and kept in conformity, with demand was through changes in the value of the commodity used as money.

[boldening: mine]

Notice the wording “by the theory’s originators at any rate”.

And what about mining or the lack of mining?

… the value of the money commodity depended, in the longer run at least, on its costs of production, in the same way as the demand for other commodities. With the expansion of the general level of production, the value of monetary transactions through the purchases and sales of goods and services expanded pari passu, which made it profitable to expand the production of the money commodity in line with commodities in general. From the very beginning, therefore, the increase in the supply of money in circulation was a response to increased demand and not an autonomous event, though occasionally the supply of the money commodity ran ahead of the increase in the supply of other commodities, as with the gold and silver discovered in the new Spanish colonies of the sixteenth century; at such times, money could be said to have exerted an autonomous influence on the demand for goods and services. It did so because those who first came into the possession of the new gold or silver were thereby personally enriched, and thus became the source of additional demand for goods and services. But the converse of this proposition was equally true: where the increase in the supply of the money commodity lagged behind, this placed obstacles on economic expansion that historically were gradually overcome with the successive introduction of money substitutes.

Kaldor then goes into the development of the banking system:

This latter development was closely associated with the development of banking. Originally, goldsmiths (who possessed strong rooms for holding gold and other valuables) developed the facility of accepting gold for safekeeping, and issued deposit certificates to the owners. The latter found it convenient to make payments by means of these certificates, thereby saving the time and trouble of taking gold coins out of the strong room only to have them re-deposited by the recipient of the payment, who was likely to have much the same incentive of keeping valuables deposited for safekeeping. The next step in the evolution toward a credit-money system was when the goldsmiths found it convenient to lend money as well as to accept it on deposit for safekeeping. For the purpose of lending they had to issue their own promissory notes to pay cash to the bearer (as distinct from a named depositor) on demand; with this latter development the goldsmiths became bankers, i.e., financial intermediaries between lenders and borrowers. Since real money (gold) was only required on specific occasions (when payments had to be made abroad or when the contract specifically provided for payment in cash), the banks found that the amount of such notes issued to borrowers came to exceed by many times the amount of gold deposited in their vaults by the lenders- though the total amount they owed to the lenders was always larger than the total amount lent to the borrowers. The apparent contradiction between the formal solvency of the banks when the volume of credits granted to borrowers was compared with their total obligation to their depositors, and their palpable insolvency when the value of the promissory notes issued was compared with the amount of gold held for their encashment, was not properly understood for a surprisingly long period. It gave rise to prolonged controversies between those (like Edwin Cannan) who firmly believed in “cloakroom banking” and those who believed that, by issuing pieces of paper that came to serve as a circulating medium, the banks were “creating credit,” which meant an effective enlargement of the money supply.

Did central banks “control” the money stock during gold exchange standards? Kaldor says:

Traditionally, the core of central-banking policy consisted of protecting the reserves (in gold or reserve currencies) through the instrument of changes in the bank rate. Ostensibly, such changes served the purpose of keeping the balance of payments with foreign countries on an even keel – a loss of reserves was taken as evidence of an unfavorable balance, and vice versa. The policy worked in the sense that even moderate changes in short-term interest rates (relative to other financial centers) sufficed to reverse the trend in the movement in reserves. But until the new monetarism came into fashion, stabilizing the quantity of money in circulation, as distinct from stabilizing the volume of international reserves, was not regarded as a primary objective.

One more thing. There is a very interesting point that Kaldor makes at the beginning of the article – the ending of the following is the point of the greatest interest to me.

In the light of the above, the main contention – and indeed, the sine qua non – of monetarism, that the money supply of each “economy” is exogenously determined by the monetary authority of the “economy” concerned, may be questioned from the start. Monetarists, following Milton Friedman, assume that the monetary authority determines the so-called “monetary base” (or “high-powered money,” to use Friedman’s expression), which is nothing else but the amount of bank notes issued which at any one time are partly in the hands of the public and partly in the hands of the banks, whether in the form of vault-cash or of deposits with the central bank; either legally enforceable rules or conventions determine an established ratio between this “base money” and all other forms of money. Hence the “monetary authority” ultimately determines the supply of money in all forms. It does so partly by active measures such as “open-market operations,” by which the central bank buys or sells government securities in exchange for its own notes, and partly by passive measures, the re-discounting of short-term paper consisting of public or private debt, in which it seeks to achieve its objective as regards the money supply by varying its own rate of re-discount. The further assumption that the (inverted) pyramid of bank money bears a stable relationship to the monetary base is supposed to be ensured by the banks’ rationing credit so as to prevent their liabilities from becoming larger (or rising faster) than the legal or prudential reserve ratio permitted. It is admitted, however, that each “economy” characterized by the possession of a separate currency must be wholly autonomous, which means that the central bank is not under any obligation to maintain its exchange rate at a predetermined relationship with other currencies (as was the case under the pre-1914 gold standard or the Bretton Woods system); rather, it allows its exchange rate to fluctuate freely so as to achieve a balance in the foreign-exchange market without central-bank intervention. (The possibility that payments, whether among the same nationals or between different nationals, are effected in other currencies or through transfers between extraterritorial bank accounts has not, to my knowledge, been explicitly considered.)

[last emphasis: mine]

I will have a post in the future on international flow of money, correspondent banking, foreign exchange market microstructure, fx settlements and balance of payments to argue Tobin’s wisecrack that the fixed versus floating debate obscures the problems facing the world today.

Hopefully my post (which was mainly quotes from Kaldor) may force the reader to think about the Horizontalist claim that money is endogenous and it cannot be otherwise.

Bidding Behaviour In The Eurosystem’s December 3-Year LTRO

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On 28 December 2011, the Eurosystem conducted a large 3-year LTRO (Longer-Term Refinancing Operation) in which banks in the Euro Area bid about €489bn. I covered this in my post Today’s Eurosystem LTRO and I wrote that the LTRO was to help banks meet their funding needs and that they participated in it to roll over existing debt to the financial system excluding the Eurosystem.

My post had some responses having some issues with this but today the ECB released its January Monthly Bulletin which has a section on the bidding behaviour (page 30 of the pub, 31 of the pdf) confirming this:

(click to enlarge)

Some remarks can be made regarding the bidding behaviour in the three-year LTRO. First, the large amount of liquidity obtained by euro area banks in this operation can be viewed as a reflection of their refinancing needs over the coming three years, as shown in Chart A. Measuring the rollover needs over a shorter horizon, for instance over the next six months, even though it captures the large amount of refinancing needed in the first half of 2012, does not fully explain the bidding behaviour. This suggests that medium-term funding considerations may have had a significant influence on the bidding behaviour. Indeed, in addition to assessing the rollover risk faced by banks, it is useful to consider the residual maturity of banks’ outstanding debt. The longer the residual maturity, the lower the risk that banks will need to seek market funding under unfavourable conditions. Chart B illustrates a clear negative relationship between the size of the bids and the residual maturity of the bidders’ debt. This also suggests that funding considerations may have played a major role in determining the bidding behaviour. Second, banks may have placed relatively high bids in the first three-year LTRO as they viewed the operation as attractively priced compared with the prices that could be inferred from the EURIBOR swap curves or the spreads required by the market for bond issuance in 2011.

Overall, the analysis suggests that funding considerations played a major role in the bidding behaviour of banks in this first three-year LTRO, supporting the Governing Council’s view that the announced measures will help to remove impediments to access to finance in the economy, stemming notably from spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis to banks’ funding markets.

In the press conference following the ECB Governing Council decision on monetary policy (to keep the short-term rate targets unchanged), Mario Draghi mentioned that

Let us not forget that in the first quarter of this year, more than €200 billion of bank bonds fall due. So this decision certainly prevented a potentially major funding constraint for our banking system, with all the negative consequences this might have had on the credit side.

He also repeated this and gave out interesting details in Q&A session of the Hearing on the ESRB before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament. I will update the post when the transcripts of the Q&A session become available.

Without the LTRO, banks would have faced pressures to redeem maturing obligations by asset sales which could have led to a fall in asset prices, and if the assets were government bonds, it would have increased risks of a self-fullfilling prophecy.

Of course, all this just buys more time!

James Tobin On Public Debt

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James Tobin was one of the greatest economists. He had stock-flow consistency, understood how the monetary and financial system worked and had great ideas on open economy macroeconomics. However, he struggled to express his ideas at a more formal level, especially since he used some neoclassical formalism.

This post may be of interest to Neochartalists. It seems there was a Committee on Public Debt in 1949 and they released a report Our National Debt. James Tobin reviewed the report.

Tobin begins by saying:

The peace of mind of a conscientious American must be disturbed every time he is reminded that his government is 250 billion dollars in debt. He must be shocked by the frequent announcement that every newborn baby is burdened, not with a silver spoon, but with a debt of $1700. The citizen depressed by these somber calculations will find no solace in the book under review. The Committee on Public Debt Policy and its advisors are leaders in the worlds of banking, insurance, business, economics, and education. Experts in finance, they have undertaken to enlarge public understanding of the debt. The Committee believes that the challenge can be met, the difficulties overcome, the crisis surmounted. But these hopeful prophecies are voiced in the tone of a leader summoning his people to an uphill struggle which will demand all their courage, wisdom, and devotion. The world is too full of such struggles, and the Committee does the public it wishes to enlighten no service by elevating to epic status the management of the national debt.

The book permits lay readers to retain misconceptions of the nature of public debt and exaggerated impressions of its present size. The amateur is bound to project to a national scale his own experience of private debt. To him “debt” is a frightening word, and counting debt in billions staggers his imagination. But a national debt is a burden on the nation analogous to the burden of a private debt on an individual only if the nation is in debt abroad. If the United States owed 250 billion dollars to foreign creditors, our real national income would be reduced by the five billion dollars of our annual production exported to pay the interest. As the debt became due, we would face additional sacrifices to repay it, or we could extend it only on terms allowed by foreign lenders. Happily the 250 billion dollars are owed by the Government to its own citizens. Indeed, about one quarter of the present debt is not even an obligation of the Government to its citizens; it is essentially a debt of the federal government to itself or to state and local governments. Payments of interest are not an external drain on our production, and, thanks to the lending power of the Federal Reserve System, the Government need never encounter difficulty in refinancing existing debt or in borrowing more money.

The Committee’s report seemed to have been insistent on retiring the public debt on which Tobin says:

… Deficit spending in times of high demand and full employment is certainly inflationary. This does not prove that old public debt, merely by its continued existence, is inflationary and should be retired.

The present debt represents almost entirely the wartime savings of Americans, who earned record incomes in war production and could not find consumers’ goods to buy. Had the war been financed wholly by taxation, the public could not have acquired these savings …

And on interest payments:

The second possible danger in the public debt is the burden of interest charges. Transfer of interest from taxpayers to bondholders is a nuisance. Committing a large share of the national income in advance as interest on the debt weakens incentives for effort and risk-taking. Interest transfers may promote income inequality. These evils are scarcely serious enough to justify sacrificing other objectives of current public policy to a commitment for debt retirement. Interest payments now amount to only two per cent of the national income; the percentage should decrease with economic progress provided full employment and low interest rates are maintained.

And finally:

… Decisions concerning current taxes and appropriations should be geared to the current economic situation; they should not be influenced by irrational fear of the national debt. But the debt will undoubtedly continue to be an ideological symbol invoked in every public debate. The purpose of this book, the advancement of popular understanding of the debt, remains unfulfilled.

Post Keynesian Markup Pricing

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I was collecting some articles by Basil Moore and I found this table from an article In Praise Of Markets – Wage Imitation And Price Stability (unsure as to why the article is titled “praise of markets”). The article appeared in Challenge in 1982.

Post Keynesians adopt Kaleckian theory of pricing. There are two sectors – fix price and flex price.

(The following table is for the fix-price sector).

Of course, this is just a quick and dirty way of getting into Post Keynesian pricing theory which has a rich literature and has obsessed all the leading PKEists for years.

During the 1970s, wages in advanced economies rose due to the rise in the bargaining power of labour unions and this led to a wage-price spiral. As wages increased, firms increased prices in response. This led workers to demand higher wages so as to be compensated for inflation – leading to further price rises. The pricing was also complicated by increase in other costs such as energy prices which led to an increase in markup as well. When firms faced more wage costs, they borrowed more from banks and this led to a huge increase in the money stock. (I am resisting the usage of the  word “supply” for money, as it is misleading). Monetarism came to popularity as the Monetarists led by Milton Friedman were making a lot of noises and saw the relationship and used their political powers to ask central banks to “control” the money stock. When central banks responded saying they do not and cannot control the money stock, Milton Friedman declared them “incompetent”!

Some central banks were forced to bow into political pressures and had to raise short term interest rates (i.e, they still weren’t controlling the money stock, because it cannot be controlled). This had the additional complication that firms’ interest costs (on borrowings) increased and they were forced to increase prices more. In the end, interest rates was raised to such a high level that it led to a huge fall in demand and employment, even though Monetarists’ theories continued claiming that wages will fall and “free markets” will lead to full employment!

During the period (70s/80s), there were also debates about the “velocity of money” – the supposed stability of the relationship of money stock and money income. Some Keynesians try to argue that the relationship is not stable etc. However Marc Lavoie, in an article in response to a comment to his earlier article on endogenous money pointed out:

… The second point I want to raise is the question of the stability of the velocity of money. Gedeon says that an unstable velocity is the typical post Keynesian argument and she goes into a detailed  analysis of a demand for money function that would exhibit this characteristic … I do not think that the stability or instability of the velocity of money is a fundamental question since it ignores the more vital issue of causation. Provided it is recognized that money does not determine income, post Keynesians can feel comfortable  with either stable or unstable velocity.

Monetarism is no longer as popular now as it used to be, but traces can easily be found in most theories of economics such as the “New Consensus”.

S&P’s FAQs On EA Rating Actions

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S&P released another document yesterday in connection with the rating action of Eurozone governments yesterday which you can get via it’s Tweet:

click to view the tweet on Twitter

On the political agreements, the release says:

We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness between the EMU’s core and the so-called “periphery”. As such, we believe that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers’ rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national tax revenues.

Two points.

First – yes, fiscal profligacy is not the only source of the crisis. It is typical to give the example of Spain and Ireland – and done by S&P itself – to justify this:

This to us is supported by the examples of Spain and Ireland, which ran an average fiscal deficit of 0.4% of GDP and a surplus of 1.6% of GDP, respectively, during the period 1999-2007 (versus a deficit of 2.3% of GDP in the case of Germany), while reducing significantly their public debt ratio during that period.

There is a risk in making such an argument and even progressives sometimes do so. The error is assuming that the public sector deficit is a proxy for the fiscal stance of the government! Macroeconomists using stock flow coherent macro modeling have shown that the budget balance is just an endogenous outcome and the more appropriate proxy for the fiscal stance is G/θ, where G is the government expenditure and θ is the average tax rate.

To me it seems both Spain and Ireland governments (and local governments) were actually lavish in their spending. The private sector was even more lavish in its expenditure and rising incomes led to higher tax revenues which improved the government’s budget balance before the crisis. The whole process was allowed to continue by market forces, domestic and foreign lenders who (not surprisingly) underpriced risk. Needless to say the lack of a central government overseeing demand management and the ignorance of Keynesian principles contributed to the haphazardness.

Second, most commentators – including the S&P – pay too much attention to price competitiveness. So typically one sees a graph of unit labour costs of individual nations in almost all analysis. One even does not need to take innovations in the export sector to explain the crisis.

The EA17 nations had different levels of non-price competitiveness to begin with and faster growth of income/expenditure in the “periphery” as a result of the boom as compared to slower growth in the “core” nations led to exploding current account deficits. Here’s the data from the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook published in September 2011 on the current account balances:

With different non-price competitiveness (or income elasticity of imports) (to begin with at the formation of the monetary union rather than innovations during the last ten years) combined with fast rising income/expenditure in the periphery, this led to a dramatic increase in net indebtedness of the periphery as a straightforward consequence. To emphasize the point, even if non-price competitiveness was similar between the core and the periphery, this would have resulted in rising net indebtedness.

It is surprising how international finance contributes to unsustainable processes from continuing as if they can continue forever!

Update

Paul Krugman has a new post on his NY Times Blog on the same comment from S&P from its FAQs but with a different viewpoint.

S&P Takes Rating Actions On Euro Area Governments

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On 5 December 2011, S&P put ratings of EA17 governments on rating watch negative. See my post S&P And EA17 National Governments for link to the S&P report. Today it concluded its review and downgraded several governments.

click to view  the tweet on Twitter

According to the report, which can be obtained from S&P’s Tweet:

We have lowered the long-term ratings on Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain by two notches; lowered the long-term ratings on Austria, France, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, by one notch; and affirmed the long-term ratings on Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. All ratings have been removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011 (except for Cyprus, which was first placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).

The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain are negative, indicating that we believe that there is at least a one-in-three chance that the rating will be lowered in 2012 or 2013. The outlook horizon for issuers with investment-grade ratings is up to two years, and for issuers with speculative-grade ratings up to one year. The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Germany and Slovakia are stable.

We assigned recovery ratings of `4′ to both Cyprus and Portugal, in accordance with our practice to assign recovery ratings to issuers rated in the speculative-grade category, indicating an expected recovery of 30%-50% should a default occur in the future.

S&P also cites that “an open and prolonged dispute among European policymakers over the proper approach to address challenges” as one of the reasons to take the rating actions.

How can the Euro Area solve its problems?

One of my favourite papers is A Simple Model Of Three Economies With Two Currencies (link) written by Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie. The paper was written about 7-8 years back and was published in 2006 in the Cambridge Journal of Economics.

The paper’s abstract:

This paper presents a Keynesian model which describes three countries trading merchandise and financial assets with one another. It is initially assumed that all three countries have independent fiscal policies but that two of the countries share a currency, hence the model can be used to make a preliminary analysis of the conduct of economic policy in ‘the eurozone’ vis-a`-vis the rest of the world—‘the USA’. The main conclusion will be that, if all three countries do indeed operate independent fiscal policies, the system will work under a floating currency regime, but only so long as the European central bank is prepared to modify the structure of its assets by accumulating an ever rising proportion of bills issued by any ‘weak’ euro country.

G&L make an interesting remark about a possible ECB behaviour:

… If the ECB is forbidden from accommodating market-driven changes in the composition of its assets, or if the ECB rules that it will not accumulate additional stocks of securities issued by governments that have excessively large debts according to rating agencies, then fiscal policy in the ‘weak’ countries must be endogenous for stability to prevail, for otherwise it would seem that the only alternative is to let interest rates on euro bills to diverge from country to country in an unsustainable way.

Now this would seem to be a rather dismal state of affairs, from a progressive standpoint. However, it should be noted that balanced fiscal and external positions for all could as well be reached if the euro country benefiting from a (quasi) twin surplus as a result of the negative external shock on the other euro country decided to increase its government expenditures, in an effort to get rid of its budget surplus …

i.e., Euro Area nations with a weak external sector will have to deflate fiscal policy to attempt to keep the external deficit, net indebtedness to the rest of the world and interest rate in check, if surplus nations in the Euro Area do not wish to engage in fiscal expansion. Else, as G&L conclude:

Alternatively, the present structure of the European Union would need to be modified, giving far more spending and taxing power to the European Union Parliament, transforming it into a bona fide federal government that would be able to engage into substantial equalisation payments which would automatically transfer fiscal resources from the more successful to the less successful members of the euro zone. In this manner, the eurozone would be provided with a mechanism that would reduce the present bias towards downward fiscal adjustments of the deficit countries.

In my opinion, this is the only way the Euro Area can come out of the mess because it is the only way the net indebtedness of an EA nation (or a group of nations) can be prevented from exploding relative to its domestic output .

For an earlier take on the Maastricht Treaty by Wynne Godley see the article Maastricht And All That published in the London Review of Books in 1992.

More From Nicholas Kaldor

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In a recent post, I quoted Kaldor and got a lot of response on what I quoted. So a post on more from the book The Scourge Of Monetarism from the early 80s.

In the following PSBR is Public Sector Borrowing Requirement – the term used often in the UK for net market borrowing of the UK Treasury for a given period such as a month/quarter/year.

The following appears in the Part II of the book. The Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Treasury and the Civil Service ordered an enquiry into monetary policy and Kaldor was invited to write on this in 1980. The whole text appears in the book and the following appears on pages 48-50:

In the Green Paper on Monetary Control of March 1980 it is asserted that ‘it is sometimes helpful to examine how a particular control will affect items on the asset side of the banking system’. The Paper then proceeds to state an accounting identity which shows the change in the money stock (£M3) in a given period as the sum of five separately identified items, of which PSBR is one (though it is not claimed that the five items are mutually invariant).

In my view it may be more helpful to view the effects of the PSBR on the asset side of the non-banking private sector, both at home and overseas. The PSBR in any year can be defined as the public sector’s net de-cumulation of financial assets (net dissaving) which by accounting identity must be equal to the net acquisition of financial assets (net saving) of the private sector, home and overseas; which in turn can be broken down to the net acquisition of financial assets of the personal sector, of the company sector, and the overseas sector (the latter is the negative of the balance of payments on current account). Ignoring capital flows of existing wealth to and from the country, the change in liabilities of the banking system is thus equal to that part of the net saving (or the net increment of financial assets) of the home and overseas private sector which persons and companies wish to hold in the form of sterling bank deposits as against other financial assets (such as ‘bonds’ or ‘gilts’) and which in turn is equal to that part of the PSBR which is financed by the addition of the banking system’s holding of the public sector debt.

The main monetarist thesis is that the net dissaving of the public sector is ‘inflationary’ in so far as it is ‘financed’ by the banking system and not by the sale of debt (bonds or gilts) to the public. But this view ignores the fact that the net saving, or net acquisition of financial assets of the private sector will be the same irrespective of whether it is held in the form of bank deposits or of bonds. The part of the current borrowing of the public sector which is directly financed by net purchases of public debt by the banking system – and which has its counterpart in a corresponding increase in bank deposits held by the non-banking private sector – is as much part of the net saving of the private sector as the part which is financed by the sale of gilts to the private sector. When the public sector’s de-cumulation of financial assets increases (i.e. the PSBR increases) there must be an equivalent increase in the net savings of the non-bank private sector (home and overseas) as compared with what net savings would have been with an unchanged PSBR which will be the same irrespective of how much that saving takes the form of purchases of gilts and how much takes the form of an increase in deposits with the banking system. The decision of how much of the increment in private wealth is held in one form or another is a portfolio decision depending on relative yields, the expectation of future changes in interest rates (long and short), and the premium which the owners are willing to pay for ‘liquidity’ – i.e. the possession of command over resources in a form that can be directly applied to extinguish debts or to meet financial commitments.

But it is a mistake to think that an individual’s spending plans (whether in a business or in a personal capacity) are significantly affected by the decision of how much of his wealth he decides to keep in the form of ‘money’ (broadly or narrowly defined) as against other financial assets that are readily convertible into money (including available overdraft facilities). It is equally mistaken (in my view) to assume that the part of current private saving which is held in the form of additional bank deposits gives rise to additional lending by the banks to the private sector, whereas the part which is held in the form of bonds does not. In the former case, the increase in the bank’s liabilities to depositors is matched by a corresponding increase in the banks’ holding of public sector debt.

The Transactions Flow Matrix

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Why is GDP defined as C+I+G+… and how is it related to national income, expenditure etc and that of each sector of an economy such as that of households?

The following table (redrawn by myself) taken from the book Monetary Economics by Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie gives an idea on how to go about measuring national income, product etc. The sample chapter (Contents, Chapter 1 & Index) from the publisher’s website has an introduction to the authors’ approach of studying Macroeconomics from a stock-flow consistent approach.

The table describes income and expenditures flows within an economy. Of course, as mentioned this is simplified and complications have to be added one by one. For example, there is no inventories, no external sector and households do not purchase a house etc. However, the above construction shows an easy way of building up and thinking about how funds flow between different ‘sectors’ of an economy. The reader who is new to this way of thinking should pay attention to the signs attached to each entry. For example, households receive wages and it is a source of funds for them and hence the positive sign. When they are consuming, they use funds and hence the first row in the table with the item consumption has a negative sign for households. For businesses, this a source of funds and hence positive. Another item which may be unfamiliar is the capital account of businesses. Firms purchase capital goods for their production and the sale of these goods comes from the same sector and hence one need for this column.

Even at this simplified form, there are a lot which are not known from the above table. What form does saving take? How does the government finance its excess of expenditure over income (i.e., deficit)? How do firms pay for wages and get funds to do the investment etc. To see this, we need a transactions flow matrix which I had discussed previously in my post Financial Crisis And Flow Of Funds from a not-so-pedagogic perspective. It is a foxy trick.

A few things before going into this. First notice that from the matrix,

C + I + G = Y = WB + F

So in our simplified example, gross domestic product is the sum of expenditures on goods and services and at the same time the sum of incomes paid for the production of goods and services.

Second, if you want the actual numbers (for the United States), the place to get this from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1. In particular, tables F.6 and F.7 and the hyperlink directly takes you to the table.

Back to our question on what form does saving take and how do firms finance their activities etc. Below is the table I made using TeX (and taken from the same book, Chapter 1)

The questions asked also lead us naturally to the introduction of the banking sector and its importance in the process of production, and this sector was missing in Table 1. So we can now clearly see what form saving takes. For households, this is in the form of currency notes, bank deposits, government T-bills and firms’ equities. Apart from various complications added, you may have noticed that profits are assumed to be part distributed and part retained. Firms hence finance investment by retained earnings, loans from banks and by issuance of equities, here. The government finances its deficit (i.e., excess of outlays over receipts) by issuing currency notes and T-bills. We have merged the Central Bank and the Federal Government into one sector “Govt”, for simplicity (which is also the case for Table 1). The behavioural aspects are something different and it should not be assumed that the government can “control” its deficit and that it can choose the proportion of financing in the form of currency notes and bills.

Needless to say, the above transactions flow matrix is a simplified one. For example, you may immediately notice that there is no interest payments on loans and bills yet.

It should be noted here that the entries in the table are flows and hence you may see a lot of Δs. The reader who is relatively new to this should not fail to observe the signs attaching each entry. The negative sign in the entry for deposits for households may be confusing at first, but the self-consistency of the whole construction forces the signs on these entries.

It is worth emphasizing that the fact that all rows and columns sum to zero and this makes the whole construction very appealing. When I was trying to get myself introduced to economics about 3 years back, I browsed around the internet and quickly came across the transactions flow matrix – exactly what I was looking for!

This construction greatly simplifies visualizing flow of funds as compared to the Blue Book way of doing it. The following is the 2008 SNA way of maintaining national accounts and there is some additional effort one needs to visualize this without the usage of a transactions flow matrix!

(click to enlarge)

Books In Honour Of Wynne Godley

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There are two new books in honour of Wynne Godley and they are out now

The first one – edited by Marc Lavoie and Gennaro Zezza – has selected articles and papers by Wynne Godley, and carefully chosen.

It’s available at amazon.co.uk, but not yet on amazon.com

Here’s the book’s website on Palgrave Macmillan. The book also contains the full bibliography of Godley’s papers, books, working papers, memoranda (such as to the UK expenditure committee), magazine/newspaper articles, letters to the editor etc.

Here’s a picture I took of Marc at Levy Institute in May when he was deciding on the cover.

The is second book written in honour of Wynne Godley contains proceeding of the conference held in May at the Levy Institute (the same place the above photograph was taken)

The publisher’s website for the book is here.

Dimitri says:

The death of Wynne Godley silences a forceful and very often critical voice in macroeconomics. Wynne’s own strong view, that although his work was representative of the non-mainstream Keynesian approach to economics and especially economic policy was important nevertheless, has been confirmed time and time again as evidenced in the fortunes of the UK, US and Eurozone economies. His writings, reflecting the sharpness of his mind and intellectual integrity, have had a considerable impact on macroeconomics and have aroused the interest of scholars, economic journalists and policymakers in both mainstream and alternative thought. In a review of Wynne’s last book with Marc Lavoie (2007), Lance Taylor had this to say: ‘Wynne’s important contributions are foxy – brilliant innovations… that feed into the architecture of his models’

I also like Wynne’s stand on the current account imbalance of the United States:

Bibow finds that Godley’s diagnosis of the looming economic and financial difficulties ahead of their occurrence was prescient with regard to US domestic developments – a theme that came up in the chapters by Wray and Galbraith. But Bibow takes issue with Wynne’s assessment of the US external balance being unsustainable. He notes that the US investment position and income flows are more or less in balance and he attributes this phenomenon to the safety of the US Treasury securities and the dollar functioning as the reserve currency.

Dimitri then says

Even if this is so, it cannot continue indefinitely, Wynne would have replied.

The conference page is here

Alfred Eichner And Federal Reserve Operating Procedures

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Alfred Eichner was a Post-Keynesian economist known for his text Macrodynamics of Advanced Market Economies published 3 years after his death in 1988. He died at the age of 50 in an accident and at the time he was preparing to include an analysis of open economy macroeconomics in his story of how economies work.

This post is about an article/chapter he wrote (with Leonard Forman and Miles Groves)* in 1984 in a book titled Money And Macro Policy edited by Marc Jarsulic. It is a fantastic book with chapters written by Basil Moore and Marc Lavoie as well on the endogeneity of money. I discussed this previously in my post More On Horizontalism.

Google Books allows a preview of the chapter and embedding it on a webpage and I have done so at the end of this post. If it doesn’t appear properly in your browser, please let me know. Else, like me, you can buy the book 🙂 Of course G-books won’t allow a preview of all pages due to copyright restrictions.

Eichner’s chapter (#2) is titled The Demand Curve For Money Further Considered. 

The authors start off the description with

First, the amount of bank reserves, and thus the monetary base, is not the exogenously determined variable assumed in both orthodox Keynesian and monetarist models but instead depends on the level of nominal income. This is because the central bank, in order to maintain the liquidity of the financial system, is forced to purchase government securities in the open market so as to accommodate, at least in part, the need for additional credit as the pace of economic activity quickens. With the amount of unborrowed bank reserves, and thus the monetary base, to a significant extent endogenously determined, it follows that the money supply is, to no less an extent endogenously determined as well. It is therefore a misspecification to assume that the money stock, or any of its components, is entirely exogenous, subject to the control of the monetary authorities, and then to derive a demand curve for money based on that assumption. In reality, the demand for and supply of “money” are interdependent, with no possibility in practice of being able to distinguish between the two.

Second, it is the demand for credit rather than the demand for money which is the necessary starting point for analyzing the role played by monetary factors in determining the level of real economic activity…

The authors then point out the neutralizing nature of open-market operations of the Fed. Usually this – open market operations – is presented in textbooks and in some old Federal Reserve publications as causing the amount of reserves to rise and allowing banks to increase the supply of reserves. Eichner had earlier worked with data and failed to see open market operations increasing the amount of reserves in practice. He realized that the open market operations neutralize flows:

… Thus, in the face of a fluctuating public demand for currency, flows of gold into and out of the country, variations in the amount of deposits held at the Fed by foreigners and others, changes in the amount of float and fluctuations in the Treasury’s cash holdings, the Fed must engage in open-market operations just to maintain bank reserves at a given level. This is the neutralizing component of a fully accommodating policy, and it is one reason why it is difficult in practice to relate change in bank reserves to open market operations …

What is so nice about the quote above is that Eichner knew exactly what factors affect reserve balances. At the time, “float” may have been more important than it is today. Eichner not only knew that the Treasury’s account at the Fed affects reserve balances but also holdings of other institutions such as foreign central banks – i.e., as a result of “flows of funds into or out of the Federal Reserve System” in his own words. (In the same paragraph from which the quote is taken).

Further the article goes:

An increase in the demand for credit will, to the extent it is satisfied, lead to an increase in bank deposits (especially demand deposits). This is because banks make loans by simply crediting the borrower’s account at the bank with the funds advanced. The increase in deposits will, however, require that banks maintain larger reserves at the Fed. Thus required reserves, ResR, will increase and, unless the Fed acts through the purchase of government securities in the open market to provide banks with the necessary additional reserves, banks will find themselves with insufficient reserves to meet their legal requirements… the Fed is forced to accommodate, at least in part,  whatever demand for credit may manifest itself.

The terminology “accommodating” was later made clear later by Eichner in his book Macrodynamics as operations aimed at pegging the short term interest rate whatever the economic or credit conditions. So when the Fed is not accommodating – in this terminology – it means it is pursuing a policy of raising rates at frequent intervals with an aim to impact credit and aggregate demand.

The Google Books link is embedded below.

click to view on Google Books

Endnote

*Chief Economist and Economic Analyst, respectively at The New York Times at the time of writing.