Monthly Archives: December 2021

Neochartalists On Turkey, Part 2

This is in continuation of the post Neochartalists (“MMTers”) On Turkey, written three days ago and which didn’t discuss what neochartalists (“MMT” people) have to say about the crisis. I am looking specifically a blog post Turkey Tells Us Nothing About MMT – But MMT Tells Us A Lot About Why Turkey Is In Trouble by Bill Mitchell written yesterday.

Bill Mitchell is responding to critics and he describes their criticisms as follows:

I have noticed a lot of Internet traffic about Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and the situation in Turkey at present. Apparently, as the narrative goes, MMT is finally being revealed as a fraud because Turkey’s economy is going backwards and its currency is depreciating rapidly. The logic, it seems, is that if a nation enters rough economic waters and the financial markets sell its currency (although remember someone has to be buying it simultaneously) then that proves MMT is false. An extraordinarily naive viewpoint if you think about it.

As if someone having to be buying it simultaneously is some kind of owning of critics!

Anyways, Mitchell straightforwardly denies there’s some issue with neochartalism in the conclusion:

What is clear, an MMT understanding leads one to worry intensely about a nation that has built a growth strategy on vast amounts of foreign currency debt and expanding exports. The two arms of this sort of growth strategy leaves a nation highly vulnerable to changes of circumstances in world export markets.

Add in a central bank that is also borrowing foreign currencies and showing it intends to use their stores to defend the lira.

Add in a deregulated banking sector that is flooded with foreign debt to maintain profits.

Result: disaster pending.

So at least he accepts there’s a crisis rather than dismissing the whole thing as meh!

I don’t think his point about over-reliance on exports is correct but his main points is the holding of foreign currency debt by the government (or the central bank).

The important point however is that an external crisis will always go through a phase where the government has negative open positions in foreign currency. Neochartalists can always claim that neochartalism is right but that’s useless to anyone. Neochartalists fail to understand why such a thing happens from a monetary theory/finance perspective.

The idea that some governments have to necessarily issue debt in foreign currency comes as counterintuitive but the alternative is shutting down of the foreign exchange markets and economic activity with the rest of the world. When the exchange rate is falling, the government must sell foreign exchange to stabilise. Like buying foreign exchange has an depreciating effect on the currency, selling has the reverse. The sale of foreign exchange shifts foreigners’ portfolio from assets held in the domestic currency to assets held in foreign currency, bringing about a reduction in order flows to sell. But the amount of foreign exchange to be sold can be large. And the above illustrates how governments/central banks would need to obtain foreign currency to sell and in the process become indebted in foreign currency. It’s as simple as that!

Of course the government/central bank can also obtain foreign exchange from purchases in the foreign exchange markets, when exports are high compared to imports, and build reserves this way without affecting the exchange rate too much and many countries’ governments do that, but it’s not always possible as exports depends on competitiveness in world markets and general demand conditions.

Ronald McKinnon—although a neoclassical economist—understood this problem and had a fine description of problems governments face because of the foreign exchange market in his paper Money And Finance On The Periphery Of The International Dollar Standard, published in 2002. See Section 6 on various options available via fixing or floating exchange rates and banking/finance regulation and limitations. You need to filter out the wrong stuff to extract the good parts!

So blaming the government for having government debt in foreign currency isn’t helpful. It’s just like neoclassical economics: the theory goes wrong, blame the actors instead of wondering if your theory might be wrong.

Neochartalists (“MMTers”) On Turkey

In recent days, the Turkish Lira ₺ has been depreciating a lot. In fact, the President ordered interest rate cuts as he thought it would stop the crash but that made the problem worse. The central bank has sold foreign reserves to try to stop the fall but it doesn’t have enough reserves.

For now, I just wanted to record a ridiculous proposal by Warren Mosler to cut the policy rate to zero, something he has been advocating for every country with floating exchange rate since forever.

On August 31st this year, he tweeted:

I’ve proposed that Turkey cut the policy rate to 0 to reduce inflation and firm the lira.

Randall Wray, in a chapter What A Long, Strange Trip It’s Been: Can We Muddle Through Without Fiscal Policy? in the book Post-Keynesian Principles of Economic Policy written in 2006 made this claim:

… for such a country [a sovereign nation with a floating currency] (even Turkey), both a budget deficit and a current account deficit are indefinitely sustainable.

Clearly, the neochartalists should accept the shortcomings in their theory. There’s a good literature in Post-Keynesian theory about external constraints.

Neochartalists start with a wrong claim “imports are a benefit, exports a cost”. In that they make it look like mainstream theory is for restriction of international trade whereas in reality it’s just the opposite. By starting completely wrong, they reach the most ridiculous of conclusions. Turkey has to improve its balance of payments and international investment position by improving its trade balance. Zero interest rate won’t help.

Ramesh Chandra On Nicholas Kaldor And Circular Cumulative Causation

Ramesh Chandra has a recently released book Endogenous Growth In Historical Perspective: From Adam Smith To Paul Romer, and one of his chapters is on Nicholas Kaldor and circular and cumulative causation.

Chandra’s own views are different but I thought his description of Gunnar Myrdal and Nicholas Kaldor’s insights was amazing with the most appropriate quotes like the following (from page 201 in print/209 in pdf):

Gunnar Myrdal (1956, 1957) and Nicholas Kaldor (1978), on the other hand, argued that because of the operation of circular cumulative causation free trade led to interregional and international inequalities. Myrdal (1956) maintained that “if left to its own course, economic development is a process of circular and cumulative causation which tends to award its favours to those who are already well endowed and even to thwart the effort of those who happen to live in regions that are lagging behind” (quoted from Meier 1989, p. 385). Further, “on the international as well as national level trade does not by itself necessarily work for equality. A widening of markets strengthens often on the first hand the progressive countries whose manufacturing industries have the lead and are already fortified in surroundings of external economies, while the underdeveloped countries are in continuous danger of seeing even what they have of industry and, in particular, their small scale industry and handicrafts outcompeted by cheap imports from industrial countries, if they do not protect them” (ibid., p. 385). International trade does promote primary exports from developing countries but here they face adverse demand conditions or inelastic demand in world markets. Any technological improvements which reduce primary goods prices benefit the importing countries. Thus, “forces in the markets will in a cumulative way tend to cause even greater international inequalities between countries as to their level of economic development and average national income per capita” (ibid., p. 385).

Likewise, Kaldor (1978), in his paper “Nemesis of free trade”, thought that free trade may be good under constant costs but under increasing returns it benefitted some countries (or regions) at the cost impoverishment of others. He agreed with Myrdal that international trade perpetuated international inequalities, and developing countries would do well if they industrialized behind tariff and quantitative restrictions. Kaldor also stated that protectionism was good not only for developing countries but also for a developed country like Britain. In the initial stages of her growth, free trade suited Britain. But after Germany, France, USA, and Japan industrialized, Britain could not compete and one market after another became closed. Had Britain not been ideologically wedded to free trade, her living standards would have been much better.

References

Kaldor, Nicholas. 1978. Nemesis of free trade. In Further Essays on Applied Economics. London: Duckworth.

Meier, Gerald M. 1989. Leading Issues in Economic Development. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1956. Development and Underdevelopment. Cairo: National Bank of Egypt Fiftieth Commemoration Lectures.

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1957. Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. London: Gerald Duckworth