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Brad Setser On The U.S., China And The New “Adjusted Trade Balance”

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Since Donald Trump considers the US trade imbalance as the root of all problems and there is—understandably for many reasons—a resistance to Trump, there is a tendency to deny anything he says. This movement is led by Paul Krugman who repeatedly attempts to play down the supreme importance of the critical imbalance of US trade.

One is the trade imbalance with China. In the pre-globalised world, trade deficit would mean what it means. But because of offshoring of production to exploit low wages in Asia, things are more complicated.

Consider the manufacturing of iPhone by Apple Inc., everyone’s favourite example. Although it’s more complicated with involvement of countries such as Taiwan and Ireland (or maybe more), let’s simplify and assume that the whole process is just between the US, China and a third country where the phones are exported to.

This is recorded as a service export to China, goods produced in China, adding to its exports and GDP. The profits of Apple Inc.‘s investment in China adds to the United States’ primary income account of the current account of balance of payments, not the goods and services account.

But if the price was the same had Apple directly exported its phones to the third country (which wouldn’t be the case in reality, since producing in the US is costlier, but let’s ignore), the goods and services account in the current account would have been counted differently.

To put it differently, the goods and services account might give a misleading picture of the trade deficit. But some have exploited this fact to somehow try to convey that somehow, the US trade imbalance with China is nothingburger. 🤦🏻‍♂️

Brad Setser has a great post on his blog Follow The Money addressing the issue. He says:

… rather than providing a better measure of trade, the “augmented” trade balance simply adds to the confusion. It suggests that China doesn’t run a surplus with the U.S. when in reality it does, and it suggests that China isn’t a creditor to the United States when in reality it is.

Brad’s point is that the ones trying to underplay the trade deficit do so by adding gross sales to the US goods and services account in the current account of balance of payments instead of adding profits of US firms’ overseas investment. He gives the true picture.

The Burden Of Adjustment And Keynes’ Solution

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Argentina had a balance-of-payments crisis recently and required help. The IMF has agreed for a stand-by arrangement of $50 billion on the condition in the IMF’s own words:

“At the core of the government’s economic plan is a rebalancing of the fiscal position. We fully support this priority and welcome the authorities’ intention to accelerate the pace at which they reduce the federal government’s deficit, restoring the primary balance by 2020. This measure will ultimately lessen the government financing needs, put public debt on a downward trajectory, and as President Macri has stated, relieve a burden from Argentina’s back.

So Argentina has to agree on policies with deflationary bias to its output. John Maynard Keynes made this observation, had a completely different attitude than the IMF and proposed to change it. From The Collected Writings Of John Maynard Keynes, Volume XXV: Shaping The Post-War World: The Clearing Union, Chapter 1, The Origins Of The Clearing Union, 1940-1942, pages 27-30:

III. The Analysis of the Problem

I believe that the main cause of failure (except in special, transient conditions) of the freely convertible international metallic standard (first silver and then gold) can be traced to a single characteristic. I ask close attention to this, because I should argue that this provides the clue to the nature of any alternative which is to be successful.

It is characteristic of a freely convertible international standard that it throws the main burden of adjustment on the country which is in the debtor position on the international balance of payments,—that is on the country which is (in this context) by hypothesis the weaker and above all the smaller in comparison with the other side of the scales which (for this purpose) is the rest of the world.

Take the classical theory that the unlimited free flow of gold automatically brings about adjustments of price-levels and activity between the debtor country and the recipient creditor, which will eventually reverse the pressure. It is usual to-day to object to this theory that it is too dependent on a crude and now abandoned quantity theory of money and that it ignores the lack of elasticity in the social structure of wages and prices. But even to the extent that it holds good in spite of these grave objections, if a country is in economic importance even a fifth of the world as a whole, a given loss of gold will presumably exercise four times as much pressure at home as abroad, with a still greater disparity if it is only a tenth or a twentieth of the world, so that the contribution in terms of the resulting social strains which the debtor country has to make to the restoration of equilibrium by changing its prices and wages is altogether out of proportion to the contribution asked of its creditors. Nor is this all. To begin with, the social strain of an adjustment downwards is much greater than that of an adjustment upwards. And besides this, the process of adjustment is compulsory for the debtor and voluntary for the creditor. If the creditor does not choose to make, or allow, his share of the adjustment, he suffers no inconvenience. For whilst a country’s reserve cannot fall below zero, there is no ceiling which sets an upper limit. The same is true if international loans are to be the means of adjustment. The debtor must borrow; the creditor is under no such compulsion.

…

… Thus it has been an inherent characteristic of the automatic international metallic currency (apart from special circumstances) to force adjustments in the direction most disruptive of social order, and to throw the burden on the countries least able to support it, making the poor poorer.

…

I conclude, therefore, that the architects of a successful international system must be guided by these lessons. The object of the new system must be to require the chief initiative from the creditor countries, whilst maintaining enough discipline in the debtor countries to prevent them from exploiting the new ease allowed them in living profligately beyond their means.

So Keynes proposed to change this so that creditors also share the burden. In his plan for Bretton Woods (page 80), he proposed to impose a penalty on creditor nations and also require them to take measures such as:

(a) Measures for the expansion of domestic credit and domestic demand.
(b) The appreciation of its local currency in terms of bancor, or, alternatively, the encouragement of an increase in money rates of earnings;
(c) The reduction of tariffs and other discouragements against imports.
(d) International development loans.

Of course we are past the Bretton Woods system and have a system of a mix of fixed and floating exchange rates but it hasn’t provided the market mechanism required to resolve imbalances. The adjustment is still on output and employment. Hence the need for an official mechanism to resolve imbalances. Bancor isn’t relevant now, but official intervention is.

Sergio Cesaratto — The Nature Of The Eurocrisis: A Reply To Febrero, Uxó And Bermejo

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Recently I commented on a paper, The Financial Crisis In The Eurozone: A Balance-Of-Payments Crisis With A Single Currency? by Eladio Febrero, Jorge Uxó and Fernando Bermejo, published in ROKE, Review Of Keynesian Economics. I hadn’t realised that Sergio Cesaratto has a reply (paywalled) in the same issue.

Sergio Cesaratto

Sergio Cesaratto. Picture credit: La Città Futura, Sergio Cesaratto

Abstract:

Febrero et al. (2018) criticise the balance-of-payments (BoP) view of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) crisis. I have no major objections to most of the single aspects of the crisis pointed out by these authors, except that they appear to underline specific sides of the EMU crisis, while missing a unifying and realistic explanation. Specific semi-automatic mechanisms differentiate a BoP crisis in a currency union from a traditional one. Unfortunately, these mechanisms give Febrero et al. the illusion that a BoP crisis in a currency union is impossible. My conclusion is that an interpretation of the eurozone’s troubles as a BoP crisis provides a more consistent framework. The debate has some relevance for the policy prescriptions to solve the eurocrisis. Given the costs that all sides would incur if the currency union were to break up, austerity policies are still seen by European politicians as a tolerable price to pay to keep foreign imbalances at bay – with the sweetener of some European Central Bank (ECB) support, for as long as Berlin allows the ECB to provide it.

Sergio carefully responds to all views of Febrero et al. and Marc Lavoie, Randall Wray and also Paul De Grauwe, pointing out that he agrees with most of their views except that their dismissal of this being a balance-of-payments crisis with their claims that the problem could have been addressed by the Eurosystem/ECB lending to governments without limits. He points out that, “The austerity measures that accompanied the ECB’s more proactive stance are clearly to police a moral hazard problem”. It is true that the ECB, the European Commission and the IMF overdid the austerity but it doesn’t mean that Sergio’s opponents’ claims are accurate.

Euro Area Balance Of Payments, Again!

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… But more disturbing still is the notion that with a common currency the ‘balance or payments problem’ is eliminated and therefore that individual countries are relieved of the need to pay for their imports with exports.

Quite the reverse: the existence or a common currency makes a country more directly dependent on its ability to sell exports and import substitutes than it was before, particularly as it will then possess no means whereby it can (in the broadest sense) protect itself against failure.

– Wynne Godley, Commonsense Route To A Common Europe, in The Observer, 6 January 1991.

Greece had large negative current account balance of payments and Germany had the opposite over the lifetime of the Euro.

Yet, there are some economists who argue that the Euro Area crisis is not a balance of payment crisis. Of course there are other aspects to the crisis as well but this in my view is the main issue. There was a debate between Sergio Cesaratto and Marc Lavoie on this. Now there is a new paper in the most recent issue of ROKE (Review of Keynesian Economics) by Eladio Febrero, Jorge Uxó and Fernando Bermejo which discusses this. The Wayback Machine/Internet Archive link is here if you are reading it after the journal puts the paywall again.

The authors seem to be against Sergio Cesaratto view. Since I agree with Cesaratto, I thought I should comment on it.

The fundamental problem of the Euro Area is that it doesn’t have a central government. If there had been a central government like the US federal government, with large fiscal powers, the Euro Area crisis would have been far less deeper. This is because weaker regions would have been recipients of “fiscal transfers”, i.e., receive more government expenditure than what they send in taxes.

Fiscal transfers can be seen transactions in the balance of payments of Euro Area countries if the EA had a central government. The way to do balance of payments for monetary and political unions is explained in the IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment Position manual. Take a country like Greece. The Euro Area government would be considered external to Greece. Same for other countries. But for the Euro Area as a whole, the central government would be considered inside the Euro Area.

So government expenditure would appear in Greek exports in the goods and services account and transfers in the secondary income account. Taxes would appear only in the latter.

So there is an improvement in the current account balance of payments for regions compared to the case when there is no central government. Current account balances accumulate to the net international investment of the whole country. A country which has persistent imbalances would have negative net international investment position, i.e., indebtedness to other countries.

So fiscal transfers keep all this in check by improving the current account balance. So if the Euro Area had a central government, debts of a country like Greece would be in check.

By joining the half-baked half-way house, Greece got an overvalued exchange rate and easier access for other Euro Area countries into its markets and its external imbalances worsened in its lifetime inside the monetary union.

Nations with high current account deficits will also have higher public debt than otherwise and would need international investors to buy the debt which residents won’t. Normally the price would adjust to bring international investors but as we have seen, sometimes there is no price and a fall in bond prices might lead to expectations of further fall leading external investors to dump the bonds instead of finding them attractive.

The trouble with Febrero et al. is that they seem to think that the European central bank can purchase all government debt of nation. Certainly, the European Central Bank (ECB) has stepped in at various times to ease the pressure on government bond markets. But the trouble with this is that there are under some conditions such as assuming it can impose tight fiscal policy on the governments it is helping.

If the Euro Area treaty is modified to allow countries to have independent fiscal policies, then for stability, the ECB has to buy bonds without limits and can keep accumulating. It is a political mess. A country like Germany could argue that it is writing an open cheque to Greece.

A political union wouldn’t have such problems. National level governments such as the Greek government would have fiscal rules on them, and hopefully not the supranational government. This is like the United States where state governments have rules on their budgets.

In contrast, if the ECB guarantees Greece’s debt, it has to impose some rules and since Greece is not recipient of any equalisation payments—the fiscal transfers—its performance is still dependent on its competitiveness. This is because competitiveness would affect the Greece government’s fiscal balance and hence put a deflationary pressure on Greece’s fiscal stance.

On the other hand, a Euro Area with a central government would imply Greece is recipient of substantial equalisation payments and its competitiveness isn’t so binding.

An argument of the economists arguing that the European monetary system has this thing called TARGET2 and that the intra-Eurosystem balances (i.e., automatic credits offered by one national central bank to another) can rise without limit is used in this paper. This is highly misleading. It is true but one should look at the changes in debits and credits elsewhere. Suppose a country like Greece sees a large private financial outflow. While T2 can absorb a lot of this—much more than anyone imagined—in the late stages, Greece banks become heavily indebted to their national central bank, The Bank of Greece. When they run out of collateral, the rules under ELA, Emergency Liquidity Assistance, is triggered. So TARGET2 or more accurately the Eurosystem cannot absorb everything.

In summary, the Euro Area cannot do without a central government in the long run. Anyone who thinks that the ECB or the Eurosystem can buy whatever residual debt private investors doesn’t understand that in such a system, Euro Area governments are given an open cheque.

The difference between not having a central government and a central government is that in the former, there is no equivalent income flow as in the latter. The Eurosystem purchases would affect the financial account of balance of payments, not the current account.

One of the noticeable assertions of the paper is:

With T2, there is just one currency. This means that if foreign exchange markets did not exist, there could not be a BoP crisis, so that the cause of the crisis should be found elsewhere.

The trouble with this is that it sees it only as a currency crisis. But the fact is that countries whose external position were weak were the ones running into trouble in the Euro Area. Had current account deficits not blown up, countries would have had better fiscal balance since the current account balance and the budget balance are related by an identity and even behaviourally as can be seen in stock-flow consistent models. In crisis times, foreign investors are more likely to shift their funds in their home countries. With better balance of payments, public debt would be held more internally and there would have been less pressure on government bonds.

There are comments in the paper about too much credit etc. This is true, but then the Euro Area crisis would have looked more like the economic and financial crisis affected the United States.

Here’s the the NIIP of Euro Area countries in 2011.

Doesn’t this explain why Germany was in a better position than Greece when the crisis started heating up? Or that Netherlands was in a better position than Portugal?

A Comment On Wynne Godley And Non-selective Protectionism On The Article XII Of The GATT

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Nick Edmonds commented on my post Wynne Godley And Non-Selective Protectionism—which documented all the references where Wynne Godley proposes the usage of the Article XII of the GATT—pointing out that the Article XII of the GATT can only be invoked reserve assets are under threat.

Hence it is difficult for the United States to invoke it. I agree with this. It’s looks more designed for nations who accumulate reserve assets and for whom sales of reserve assets is an important way to finance current account deficits. The U.S. has some reserve assets but is under no imminent threat. (And it finances its current account deficit mainly by net incurrence of liabilities instead of sale of reserve assets).

The WTO page Technical Information on Balance of Payments has this information:

Introduction

Under the rules of the WTO, any trade restriction taken by a Member must be consistent, or in compliance, with the rules of the international trading system. Under the provisions of Article XII, XVIII:B and the “Understanding of the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the GATT 1994”, a Member may apply import restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons.

GATT: Articles XII and XVIII:B

Article XII and XVIII:B in their current form were redrafted in 1957 by the Working Party on Quantitative Restrictions. At that time, balance-of-payments measures referred to quantitative restrictions and were an exception to Article XI which prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions. Article XII can be invoked by all Members and Article XVIII:B by the developing country Members (defined as those in the early stages of development and with a low standard of living.

The basic condition for invoking Article XII is to “safeguard the [Member’s] external financial position and its balance-of-payments”; Article XVIII:B mentions the need to “safeguard the [Member’s] external financial position and ensure a level of reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development”. Both Articles refer to the need to “restore equilibrium on a sound and lasting basis”. While Article XII mentions the objective of “avoiding the uneconomic employment of resources”, Article XVIII:B refers to “assuring an economic employment of production resources”.

Article XVIII:B contains somewhat less stringent criteria than Article XII. Article XII (para. 2)states that import restrictions “shall not exceed those necessary (i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves” or (ii) “…in the case of a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves”.

Article XVIII:B (para. 9) omits the word “imminent” from the first condition and refers to an “inadequate” level rather than a “very low” level of reserves; “adequate” is defined as “adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development”.

Both Articles require Members to progressively relax the restrictions as conditions improve and eliminate them when conditions no longer justify such maintenance.

The 1979 Declaration

After the Tokyo Round, the 1979 Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes (BISD 26S/205) extended the disciplines to all trade measures imposed for balance-of-payments reasons, not just quantitative restrictions. Thus all trade measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes come within the purview of notification and consultation requirements.

The 1979 Declaration introduced three new conditions for the application of balance-of-payments measures: (i) that preference shall be given to the measure which has “the least disruptive effect on trade” while abiding by disciplines provided for in the GATT; (ii) that the simultaneous application of more than one trade measure for balance-of-payments purposes shall be avoided; and (iii) that “whenever practicable, contracting parties shall publicly announce a time schedule for the removal of the measures”. It also spelled out that measures should not be taken “for the purpose of protecting a particular industry or sector”.

…

I am sure Wynne was aware of this, so it’s curious why he mentions it over the years. If anyone knows, I’ll be grateful!

Wynne Godley And Non-selective Protectionism

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With Donald Trump threatening to impose tariffs and even retaliate on threats of retaliation, talks of protectionism is everywhere. It’s ironical that it took Trump to do this.

The usual criticism of selective tariffs is that they featherbed some industries. This was the motivation for Wynne Godley’s proposals for non-selective protectionism. With the claim that free trade is the best for everyone, also comes the implicit claim that there’s a market mechanism to resolve imbalances. Wynne didn’t believe there’s any such mechanism.

Here in this post, I will quote from all of his Strategic Analysis reports written for the Levy Institute in the years 1995-2005 which discuss this.

From, A Critical Imbalance In U.S. Trade:The U.S. Balance Of Payments, International Indebtedness, And Economic Policy, September 1995:

In-view of the potential seriousness of the problem, it is not too early to explore the possibility of using temporary, nonselective import restrictions at some stage, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as adopted and modified by the new World Trade Organization (WTO) as another means to achieve the required switch. Any such policy is to be sharply distinguished from illegal, protectionist measures used selectively to protect sectoral interests at home or against particular countries abroad.

…

Contrary to much popular supposition, the articles of the GATT, which have been adopted with some modification by the new WTO, sponsor the use of import controls if there is a conflict between the objectives of full employment and balance of payments equilibrium. Article 12 states in its first paragraph that contracting parties “in order to safeguard [their] external financial position and . . . balance of payments, may restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported.” Later, paragraph 3(d) makes it clear that import controls may be justified if “the achievement and maintenance of full . . . employment [generates] a high level of demand for imports involving a threat to its monetary reserves.” It seems that for the GATT, as for the WTO, the principles of nonselectivity and nondiscrimination are as fundamental as that of free trade as such. In particular, the use of nonselective controls for balance of payments reasons, as envisaged by Article 12, is a totally different kettle of fish from the discriminatory imposition of prohibitive tariffs on imports (for example, on goods imported to the United States from Japan) in support of sectoral interests. Such tariffs have recently been under active consideration by the U.S. government, in flagrant violation of the spirit and letter of the WTO agreements to which it is a signatory. Article 12 has recently received a new gloss in the understanding reached in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round. Whereas the original Article 12 sponsors the use of quantitative controls (such as quotas) that lead to endless administrative hanky-panky, the new understanding expresses a welcome preference for “price-based” measures, by which it means “import surcharges, import deposit requirements or other equivalent trade measures with an impact on the price of imported goods.”

Obiter Dicta

If price-based import controls of the kind sponsored by the WTO (say, a uniform, nondiscriminatory tariff on all imports of goods and services) were used to reduce the US. propensity to import, it might be possible, indeed it might be necessary, to cut general taxes (or increase public expenditures) for as long as the tariff was in force. The scale of any tax reduction would depend on the extent to which the tariff was absorbed by foreign suppliers and on the United States’s price elasticity of demand for imports.

But what about free trade and its benefits? What about inefficiency caused by the featherbedding of domestic industries that are being kept on their toes by foreign competition? And wouldn’t the restriction of imports be neutralized by retaliation on the part of other countries?

The criticisms regarding featherbedding and inefficiency apply with full force to the kind of protectionist measures that the United States has been threatening to impose on Japanese cars and components. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that totally nonselective, price-based measures taken because of a strategic conflict between the need for balance of payments equilibrium and the achievement of full employment have an entirely different character from selective measures taken to protect sectoral interests. Nonselective “macroprotection” (it might as well be called) does not reduce imports below where they would otherwise have to be in the long run, so it does no harm to the United States’s trading partners; the important difference is that imports are brought to an acceptable level at higher levels of domestic output than would otherwise be the case.

As for retaliation, the measures considered here are only those nonselective measures that are in accordance with the provisions of the articles of the WTO and GATT. If, as a consequence, retaliatory measures were taken selectively against the United States, it would be the countries taking such measures that would be acting illegally and the United States could validly complain.

From, Seven Unsustainable Processes, January 1999 : 

Policy Considerations

The main conclusion of this paper is that if, as seems likely, the United States enters an era of stagnation in the first decade of the new millennium, it will become necessary both to relax the fiscal stance and to increase exports relative to imports. According to the models deployed, there is no great technical difficulty about carrying out such a program except that it will be difficult to get the timing right. For instance, it would be quite wrong to relax fiscal policy immediately, just as the credit boom reaches its peak. As stated in the introduction, this paper does not argue in favor of fiscal fine-tuning; its central contention is rather that the whole stance of fiscal policy is wrong in that it is much too restrictive to be consistent with full employment in the long run. A more formidable obstacle to the implementation of a wholesale relaxation of fiscal policy at any stage resides in the fact that this would run slap contrary to the powerfully entrenched, political culture of the present time.

The logic of this analysis is that, over the coming five to ten years, it will be necessary not only to bring about a substantial relaxation in the fiscal stance but also to ensure, by one means or another, that there is a structural improvement in the United States’s balance of payments. It is not legitimate to assume that the external deficit will at some stage automatically correct itself; too many countries in the past have found themselves trapped by exploding overseas indebtedness that had eventually to be corrected by force majeure for this to be tenable.

There are, in principle, four ways in which the net export demand can be increased: (1) by depreciating the currency, (2) by deflating the economy to the point at which imports are reduced to the level of exports, (3) by getting other countries to expand their economies by fiscal or other means, and (4) by adopting “Article 12 control” of imports, so called after Article 12 of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which was creatively adjusted when the World Trade Organization came into existence specifically to allow nondiscriminatory import controls to protect a country’s foreign exchange reserves. This list of remedies for the external deficit does not include protection as commonly understood, namely, the selective use of tariffs or other discriminatory measures to assist particular industries and firms that are suffering from relative decline. This kind of protectionism is not included because, apart from other fundamental objections, it would not do the trick. Of the four alternatives, we rule out the second–progressive deflation and resulting high unemployment–on moral grounds. Serious difficulties attend the adoption of any of the remaining three remedies, but none of them can be ruled out categorically.

From, Interim Report: Notes On The U.S. Trade And Balance Of Payments Deficits, January 2000:

  1. Policy responses in principle come down to:
    1. Reducing domestic demand
    2. Raising foreign demand
    3. Reducing imports and increasing exports relative to GDP, preferably by changing relative prices.
  2. The danger is that resort (perhaps by default) will be had to remedy (a), in other words, that chronic and growing imbalances between the United States and the rest of the world come to impart a deflationary bias to the entire system, with harmful implications for activity and unemployment. Remedy (b) reads hollow when neither appropriate institutions nor agreed upon principles exist, but should not be dismissed out of hand. As for remedy (c), currency depreciation is the classic remedy. But, in view of the way global capital markets work, depreciation has ceased to be a policy instrument in any ordinary sense, and “floating” cannot be counted on to do the trick. Policymakers should be aware of the possibility of using nonselective (nondiscriminatory) control of imports in extremis in accordance with the principles set out in Article 12 of the WTO. Such a policy is to be sharply distinguished from “protectionism” as commonly understood.

…

Policymakers should not forget that under Article 12 the WTO sponsors the use of nondiscriminatory import controls if there is a conflict between the objectives of full employment and balance of payments equilibrium. Article 12 insists that the methods used to control imports should be nondiscriminatory with regard both to the countries and to the products affected and is therefore to be sharply distinguished from “protectionism,” which I understand to mean the use of selective controls to protect individually suffering enterprises. The provisions of Article 12 after revision as part of the Uruguay Round in 1994 expressed a preference for “price based” measures such as “import surcharges, import deposit requirements or other equivalent trade measures with an impact on the price of imported goods.”

Notwithstanding the deplorable advertisement, and the awful danger that the principle of nondiscrimination might be breached by powerful special interests, nondiscriminatory control of imports must stand as a realistic policy in extremis. The great advantage of import controls, as Keynes once said, is that they do stop imports from coming into the country.

From, As The Implosion Begins … ? Prospects And Policies For The U.S. Economy: A Strategic View, July 2001:

A substantial expansion of net export demand is easier spoken of than achieved. The classic remedy would be to bring about a dollar devaluation. However, by our reckoning, the size of the devaluation required — under the strong assumptions that world demand is unaffected and that the gesture is not neutralized by higher inflation — is very large, in the region of 20-25 percent. Unfortunately, there is no presumption whatever that market forces will automatically bring about the required adjustment in a timely way. In today’s world of free international capital movements, devaluation of the currency has ceased to be a policy instrument in any normal or direct sense.

Another possibility is that other countries, which have so far depended on the United States through her growing external deficit to provide a locomotive force for their own economies, should be encouraged to engage in some form of coordinated reflation. Unfortunately, there exist neither the institutions nor the agreed-upon principles needed to bring such a thing about. In the very last resort, the United States should not forget that nondiscriminatory measures to control imports (not to be confused with “protectionism”) are permitted under Article 12 of the successor to the GATT.

From The United States And Her Creditors, Can The Symbiosis Last?, Sep 2005:

  • Protection directed selectively against countries with large trade surpluses against the United States—China, in particular—would not solve the problem and would be a very retrograde step in terms of global trading arrangements. If there must be protection (which we are not recommending), the U.S. government might prefer to follow the principles laid down in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Article 12.
  • A resolution of the strategic problems now facing the U.S. and world economies can probably be achieved only via an international agreement that would change the international pattern of aggregate demand, combined with a change in relative prices. Together, these measures would ensure that trade is generally balanced at full employment. But there is no immediate pressure to bring such a change about because of the “symbiosis” to which our title refers. The short-term advantage of the present situation to the United States is that she is consuming 6 percent more goods and services than she produces, with high employment, low interest rates, and low inflation. The advantage to Japan and Europe is that their exports to the United States have helped fuel their mild aggregate demand growth, while China and other East Asian countries are building a mighty industrial machine by exporting growing quantities of manufactures and simultaneously accumulating a huge stock of liquid assets. This syndrome brings the word “mercantilism”2 to mind, with U.S. securities acting as the modern equivalent of gold. Those hoping for a market solution may be chasing a mirage.

…

… increasing penetration of U.S. markets by foreign exports is having a devastating effect on what remains of the U.S. manufacturing industry, and this damage has already given rise to a great deal of protectionist pressure. But imposing a heavy tariff or quota restrictions selectively (e.g., on textiles imported from China), apart from the deplorable effect it would have on global trading arrangements, would hardly be effective as a way of rebalancing the U.S. and world economies as a whole.

Nonselective Protection

If pressure for selective protection threatens to become irresistible, the U.S. government might consider a less damaging alternative. It is not always remembered that the articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), which were adopted with some important modifications by the WTO, sponsor the use of import controls if there is a conflict between the objectives of full employment and current account equilibrium. Article 12 states in its first paragraph that contracting parties “in order to safeguard their external position and . . . balance of payments, may restrict the quantity or value of imports permitted to be imported.” The original Article 12 specified that any import controls should take the form of quantitative restrictions,12 but the new WTO version expresses a welcome preference for “price-based” measures, by which it means “import surcharges, import deposit requirements, and other equivalent trade measures with an impact on the price of imported goods.” In view of the potentially serious and intractable strategic predicament that looms in the medium term, it is appropriate that the possibility of introducing nonselective, price-based import restrictions—call them “Article 12 Restrictions” or “A12Rs” for short—should be calmly considered without fear that we or anyone else will be accused of political incorrectness or treason to the economics profession.

A devaluation of the currency, the proper remedy for imbalances, is virtually equivalent, in its effect on the current account and in all other respects, to the imposition of a uniform tariff on all imports accompanied by a subsidy of equivalent value on all exports. The main difference resides in the fact that a tax/subsidy scheme does not imply any revaluation of overseas assets and the income they generate. It is, accordingly, difficult to see why the introduction of a uniform surcharge on all imports, which may be seen as half of a devaluation, should arouse such passionate opposition, so long as the surcharge is completely nondiscriminatory with regard both to product and to country of origin. The significant difference between devaluation and A12Rs is that the former tends to result in a deterioration in the terms of trade for the devaluing country while the latter tend to improve them—but this difference is not likely to be of great quantitative importance.

Ignore, for a moment, the extreme difficulty of ensuring total nondiscrimination and the extremely bad impression that would inevitably be created internationally by the use of A12Rs. First, unlike devaluation, which is only remotely possible as a policy option, the U.S. government can impose A12Rs almost at will.13 They could conceivably take the form of an auctioned quota scheme,14 which would use a market mechanism to ensure that the (ex-tax) value of imports is relatively quickly restricted to what can be paid for by exports. Under such a scheme, all imports would need to be licensed, with the number of licenses restricted—with respect to the value of imports permitted—to correspond with some (high) proportion of exports in a recent period. The price of licenses to importers would then be determined by supply and demand.

To satisfy ourselves that the use of nondiscriminatory tariffs could generate an improvement in the trade balance and to explore various other properties of such a venture, we introduced a tariff scenario into our formal model. Starting from our baseline projection, it was assumed that a uniform tariff would be imposed at the rate of 25 percent on all non-oil goods at the beginning of 2006, generating additional revenue of $370 billion for the government. The second assumption related to the rate of pass-through, which is the extent to which the cost of tariffs would be passed along to U.S. consumers. The rate of pass-through was assumed to be 50 percent, implying a rise of 12.5 percent, including taxes, in the price of imports and in consequence a 2–2.5 percent fall in their volume. These changes are relative to what otherwise would have happened. It was further assumed that retaliatory surcharges (at an average rate of 10 percent) would be imposed by foreigners on U.S. exports, with effects on U.S. export prices and volumes matching those assumed for imports.

2 According to www.britannica.com, the underlying principles of mercantilism are “1) the importance of possessing a large amount of the precious metals; 2) an exaltation a) of foreign trade over domestic, and b) of the industry which works up materials over that which provides them; 3) the value of a dense population as an element of domestic strength; and 4) the employment of state action in furthering artificially the attainment of the ends proposed.”

…

12 This was drafted by James Meade, who informed one of the authors that against his very strong personal opinion he had been compelled by the U.S. delegation to specify quantitative controls. He would have been pleased by the new version adopted in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round.

13 It is not suggested that the United States actually invoke Article 12, just that it follow Article 12 principles.

14 Such a scheme has already been suggested by Warren Buffett (2003).

Christine Lagarde On Germany’s Balance Of Payments

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Yesterday, there was a joint conference, Germany – Current Economic Policy Debates, jointly organized by the German Bundesbank and the IMF.

Christine Lagarde wrote an article, Three German Economic Challenges with European Effect at IMFBlog.

In that discusses Germany’s 🇩🇪 current account balance of payments:

Challenge 3: More balanced savings and investments

Another feature of the German economic recovery is the country’s high current account surplus. At nearly 8 percent of GDP, it is also the highest in the world in dollar terms. The high surplus shows that German households and companies still prefer to save rather than invest.

For our part, the IMF has indicated that this surplus is too large—even considering the need to save for retirement in an aging society. Boosting investment in the German economy and reducing the need to save for retirement by encouraging older workers to remain in the labor force can lower the surplus. We need to ask why German households and companies save so much and invest so little, and what policies can resolve this tension.

It’s welcome but still far from any action.

I also have a dislike for this kind of narrative. Usually the phrase saving is used in such discussion because of the identity:

National Saving = National Investment + CAB

where, CAB is the current account balance.

But the saving here is not the same as household saving and/or firms’ saving. Also it needn’t be the case that firms’ investment is low. It’s very well possible that households’ and firms may be saving low and yet the current account balance is high. This is because it depends on other things such as fiscal policy, competitiveness of German firms etc. The same argument is repeated in the other direction when the discussion is about the United States, with the claim that households save too little. But if US households start saving more, the US current account deficit will fall but that will be because of a fall in output and employment.

It’s important to remember that John Maynard Keynes recognized that active policy measures are needed to resolve global imbalances. He proposed to impose penalties on creditor nations in his plan for Bretton-Woods and also require them to take measures such as:

(a) Measures for the expansion of domestic credit and domestic demand.
(b) The appreciation of its local currency in terms of bancor, or, alternatively, the encouragement of an increase in money rates of earnings;
(c) The reduction of tariffs and other discouragements against imports.
(d) International development loans.

– page 24 of The Keynes Plan

Of course Bancor is not the solution but we can still learn from Keynes’ idea for creating policies for balance of payments targets, instead of relying on the market mechanism to resolve imbalances.

Measuring Global Production And Competitiveness

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Imagine a firm F1 in the United States 🇺🇸, which sells, say, toys. The firm is solely American, insofar as the employees of this firm and factory location are concerned. But the firm also exports toys and this contributes to the United States’ exports. For simplicity, assume that raw materials aren’t imported from abroad. Let’s say sales is $120 million of which exports are $100 million.

Now, imagine the firm has offshored significant part of its production to, say, Taiwan 🇹🇼. In other words, there’s a firm F2 in Taiwan owned by significantly by F1. This gives a cost advantage to F1 and let’s say the sales are $200 million outside the U.S. and $40 million in the US.

The way the system of national accounts and balance of payments guide, i.e., the 2008 SNA and BPM6 treat these two cases are different.

Exports of the United States is $100 million in the first case but not $200 million in the second.

This is because—and I am simplifying here—the toys are manufactured by F2, which is a resident of Taiwan and the goods sold in the rest of the world (rest in relation to the United States) is between a resident unit of Taiwan and the rest of the world.

In addition, there’s a significant transfer of resources from F1 to F2 and this is captured using the concept of transfer pricing.

Of course, this doesn’t mean that these sales don’t affect the United States’ balance of payments. Remember how the current, capital and financial accounts look:

source: IMF, BPM6

In the first case, only the goods line in exports is affected in the current account.

In the second case, goods and services (transfer of resources from F1 to F2), distributed income of corporations and retained earnings are all affected.

Goods, because of transfer of some goods from F1 to F2. Also because consumers inside the United States may buy the toys.

Services, because of use of intellectual property of F1 by F2. 

Distributed income of corporations and retained earnings because F1 is a direct investor in F2.

So in our example, in the second case, the sale of toys to the the world affects exports, imports and primary income in the balance of payments.

So what was $100 million of exports could be $30 million of exports when production is offshored, whereas $200 million is more intuitive.

In other words, the goods and services balance (or the trade surplus, or the negative of the trade deficit) is changed.

So the change in the U.S. goods and services balance of payments is attributable to three things:

  1. Change in competitiveness of American firms,
  2. Changes in accounting treatment because of offshoring,
  3. Transfer pricing.

The UN 🇺🇳 guide, Guide To Measuring Global Production is a good reference for this.

It explains complications because of transfer pricing:

Transfer pricing

3.40 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010) guidance on transfer pricing13 introduced a series of guidelines that may assist MNEs and national tax authorities in using transfer prices to value intra-firm transactions and to evaluate their appropriateness for taxation purposes. The guidelines insist that intra-firm transactions are priced, as far as possible, like arm’s length transactions between unrelated third parties. The guidelines give recommendations on how these intra-firm transactions can be analyzed to determine if they meet these requirements. These recommendations cover comparable measures of profits or comparable measures of costs to be used in assessing transactions between firms.

3.41 In this context recent developments at OECD have resulted in a series of steps to be followed by member countries to limit the impact of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)14. These steps will require transparency, exchange of information between taxation authorities and general cooperation to ensure the arm’s length principle is followed in transactions between entities in an MNE group.

3.42 Nevertheless, distortions in the use of the arm’s length principle are not always tax driven. The 2008 SNA (paragraph 3.133) explains that the exchange of goods between affiliated enterprises may often be one that does not occur between independent parties (for example, specialized components that are usable only when incorporated in a finished product). Similarly, the exchange of services, such as management services and technical know-how, may have no near equivalents in the types of transactions in services that usually take place between independent parties. Thus, for transactions between affiliated parties, the determination of values comparable to market values may be difficult, and compilers may have no choice other than to accept valuations based on explicit costs incurred in production or any other values assigned by the enterprise.

3.43 The 2008 SNA explains that replacing book values based on transfer pricing with market value equivalents is perhaps desirable in principle but is an exercise calling for cautious and informed judgment. One would expect such adjustments to be enforced in the first place by the tax authorities.

13 Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations: www.oecd.org/ctp/transferpricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm

14 http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps.htm

The guide has 175 pages, so it’s very complicated!!

Again, distortions in transfer pricing isn’t the only thing. Even if it is captured properly, the mere act of offshoring changes the goods and services account numbers.

To summarize, there are two important issues here:

  1. Measurement issues for national accountants,
  2. Need for economists to understand the accounting behind all this.

So one could say that U.S. trade balance isn’t as bad as it seems, because a lot is captured in primary income account of balance of payments instead of the goods and services account. It might also partly explain why the U.S. primary income balance is so large. It should however be noted that there’s a cancelling effect in the current account and current account balance which is equally important.

The post was motivated by a tweet by Brad Setser.

How The Economist‘s Cover Story Is Causing Discomfort

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The recent cover story of The Economist on Germany’s trade surpluses—titled The German Problem: Why Germany’s Current-Account Surplus Is Bad For The World Economy— is the biggest concession the magazine has made to Keynesianism. Of course, it’s not as if the publication is now a full Keynesian but still, it’s a large admission.

I have two previous posts on this:

  1. The Economist On Germany’s Balance Of Payments
  2. John Maynard Keynes On Surplus Nations’ Obligations

So it was expected that The Economist‘s story was going to be opposed by other publications pandering to the establishment. For example, FT‘s Martin Sandbu who wrote a piece, Germany Bashing Falls Flat.

Handelsblatt had this response:

Sandbu’s main point is:

That means the accusation against Germany comes about five years too late. There was indeed a strong jump in the nation’s trade surplus half a decade ago, at a time when the world was still struggling to come out of recession. But that surplus has not changed much since.

He also says:

[the] claim [that Germany’s penchant for high saving … is a drag on global growth] trips up both analytically and contextually. Analytically, because the impulse from net trade on aggregate demand is the change in the external balance, rather than its level — much like the impulse from a fiscal deficit is the change in public borrowing as a share of economic output. So long as imports, exports and other macroeconomic aggregates grow at the same rate, a stable external balance goes along with the same steady growth of aggregate demand.

This claim has a pretense to be analytical but it’s hardly the case. This can be seen in stock-flow consistent models but it’s not the easiest to show that in a blog post, so here’s an attempt:

Divide the world into Germany (and other surplus countries) and the rest of the world. The rest of the world’s current account deficit means (without minor qualifications about “revaluations”) that its net international investment position is deteriorating by the amount of its current account deficit. So it’s not the case that if some aggregates grow at some rate, everything is fine because others—such as NIIP/GDP—aren’t.

There are many debt sustainability conditions and each should be used with care. One condition is that

cad(g) < g

where the lowercase cad is the ratio CAD/GDP, CAD is the current account deficit and g is the growth rate of GDP. It’s not as simple as it looks, because growth rate of GDP also affects the current account balance or deficit. The notation cad(g) is to indicate that it is so.

For high growth rates, cad(g) is larger than g.

In other words, sustainability implies that growth is restricted to be low.

Similarly, on the creditor’s side, an economy (i.e., Germany) growing at about 2.2% (nominal) and current account balance of 8.3%, that implies that its NIIP/GDP is rising fast (and hence deteriorating the ratio of others).

So Sandbu’s claim that those asking Germany to expand domestic demand aren’t analytical itself falls flat. His analysis just does a chart eyeballing of some numbers. Just because a few things aren’t worsening, doesn’t mean things are fine. Other metrics may be worsening.

Handelsblatt‘s analysis doesn’t really say much except claiming that Germany’s trade surplus just means its expenditure is less than its income and nothing more. It also errs on endorsing the claim that, “that national economies cannot be managed like large firms.”, which the crisis taught us is highly incorrect.

Public Debt And Current Account Deficits, Part 2

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This is a continuation of a recent post at this blog, Public Debt And Current Account Deficits, in which I argued that the current account balance of payments affects the public debt.

A usual objection to the connection is that the two deficits—current account deficit and the budget deficit—although connected by an identity, don’t move together and in fact move in the opposite direction frequently. This point was raised by the blog Econbrower, yesterday.

The identity in question is:

NL = DEF + CAB

where, NL is the private sector net lending, DEF is the government’s deficit and CAB is the current account balance of payments (and is to a zeroth order approximation, exports less imports).

This is not a behavioural hypothesis but still a useful tool to build a narrative. Also, the causality connecting the identities is domestic demand and output at home and abroad.

Imagine, initially that NL is a small positive relative to GDP (for example, NL/GDP = 2%), Also remember that,

NL = Private Income − Private Expenditure

Now assume that private expenditure rises relative to private income. This will lead to higher GDP, a higher national income and a rise in imports because of income effects and hence a lower CAB. It will also lead to higher taxes because of higher income and hence will reduce the budget deficit, DEF, ceteris paribus.

So if the current account balance is in deficit, it would mean that the budget deficit and the current account deficit move in opposite directions.

That’s the theoretical basis for the empirical relationship. But that in itself isn’t the whole story. This is because the other balance—net lending, NL—has a life of its own. As is the case in the United States and several western countries, it turned negative once or twice in the 1990s the 2000s, and when the private sector’s debt rose, it made a sharp U-turn into the positive territory. The blue line in this graph:

Click the graph to see it on FRED.

So, if net lending reverts to its mean of staying positive, one can then conclude that the cumulative budget deficit, or the public debt is affected by cumulative current account deficits.

At any rate, the public debt shouldn’t be the main object of study. What’s more important is the international investment position. And it’s an identity that:

NIIP = cumulative CAB + Revaluations

where, NIIP, is the net international investment position.

A nation which runs current account deficits can become indebted to the rest of the world. IIP is the position of assets and liabilities of resident sectors of a nation. So, the net debt (the negative of NIIP) is the nation’s debt.

The above linked Econbrowser post brings in the complication of revaluations to deny the relationship between CAB and NIIP. But revaluations can’t save you for long.

In short, both public debt and NIIP depend on current account deficits.

Finally a weak analogy: if you play in the rain, you might enjoy it as well. But then if you get sick, you can’t say, “I felt so good playing in rains, so playing in the rain didn’t make me sick”. Saying the two deficits (current account and budget) move in opposite directions is an argument like that.