Tag Archives: euro area

The Euro Area Crisis As A Balance-Of-Payments Crisis

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In a recent blog post Revisiting The Euro Crisis, J. W. Mason argues that the current account imbalances in balance of payments isn’t a/the cause of the Euro Area crisis.

This is completely wrong!

Current account deficits have an effect on the government budget balance and a higher current account deficit would lead to a higher budget deficit than otherwise. This is not just a matter of accounting but true behaviourally. The large current account deficits ultimately caused a large public debt and investors in government debt became nervous and there was a crisis in the government bond markets of the Euro Area. Since lot of government debt is held by foreigners, as it is difficult for residents to hold all that debt (when there’s large net international indebtedness), the sale and the movement of funds abroad after the sale also resulted in a banking crisis, as banks went heavily overdraft at their NCBs and didn’t have sufficient collateral.

The crisis in banking and government bond markets caused more crisis in private debt markets and fiscal retrenchment, fall in GDP and that leading to more crisis!

As simple as that!

One of Mason’s arguments is that since lending by foreigners needn’t arise out of prior saving, the result liabilities owed to foreigners isn’t really debt. But how does it follow that one thing implies the other? If foreigners transfer a large amount of funds to accounts in their home countries, there would be a banking crisis as banks would find it difficult to post collateral to their NCB (National Central Bank). The government would have to rescue banks adding to public debt and making investors nervous.

Greek banks endogenously creating money doesn’t mean that a purchase of a German product by Greek residents doesn’t reduce Greek’s net asset position or increase its net indebtedness to Germany.

Mason says:

 Many people with a Keynesian background talk about endogenous money, but fail to apply it consistently

Perhaps he is the one failing?

Take a simpler example: loans make deposits. But it’s also true that deposits are funding banks. The fact that banks created funds doesn’t imply that the created deposit isn’t a liability or debt.

Mason also discusses how the TARGET2 system works with the ECB/NCBs. The NCBs have  unlimited and uncollateralised overdrafts with each other and unlike the arrangements prior the formation of the Euro Area, there isn’t an equivalent worry about central banks running out of reserves. But unlimited overdrafts for the NCBs does not imply unlimited overdrafts for the whole country! It’s just that the crisis is seen elsewhere, like in banking and the government bonds markets.

Mason also takes issue with phrases such as “capital flight”. But investors can sell assets and move funds to another country and that can put pressure on banks. How is the phrase not helpful in describing what is going on?

The problem with the Euro Area is that with exchange rates fixed irrevocably and with governments prevented from making overdrafts at their NCBs, governments cannot devalue their currency or take independent fiscal action than allowed by markets. Fixed or floating, the problem is there, and the Euro Area setup makes it worse. Doesn’t remove the problem altogether!

You can see from the data from Eurostat that Euro Area countries with the worst net international investment position were the ones seeing the worst crisis. The net international investment position is accumulated current account balance plus revaluations/holding gains/”capital gains”.

Of course, the solution of the crisis isn’t wage deflation (sometimes referred to as internal devaluation), but the formation of a central government. With the central government, there are fiscal transfers with some Euro Area countries receiving more from the government than what they send in taxes. This would improve the current account balance of those countries, keeping imbalances in check. A central government would both be able to take independent action and keep imbalances in check.

Michael A. Landesmann On Nicholas Kaldor On The Centrifugal Forces At Work In The Euro Area

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I have noted many times since the Euro Area crisis started how Nicholas Kaldor foresaw it much earlier than anyone else. The year: 1971 ‼

I came across this article Nicholas Kaldor And Kazimierz Łaski On The Pitfalls Of The European Integration Process by Michael A. Landesmann, published in Dec 2019, which is really good. I like the phrase centrifugal forces in the abstract, as the Euro Area is designed to cause countries in it to fly apart.

An interesting snippet:

In sum, Kaldor’s analysis of the pitfalls of the Common Market comprises three components:

  • the almost unavoidable processes leading to ‘structural external imbalances’;
  • the detrimental impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), for a country like the UK …
  • the fact that external imbalances would result in a ‘deflationary bias’ in the deficit countries … This tendency would be strengthened in a fixed exchange-rate regime and, even more so, in a monetary union that would not be complemented by a fiscal union.

…

Kaldor’s analysis points to an issue that is of central importance in the set-up of the EC (and continues to be of great relevance in the EU): the likelihood of what he calls the emergence of ‘structural (external) imbalances’. He refers in this respect to G. Myrdal’s ‘circular and cumulative causation’ processes … Which are the cumulative processes that Kaldor alludes to when predicting that integrated groups of countries will experience ‘structural external imbalances’?

Marc Lavoie On The Euro Area And Neochartalism

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Marc Lavoie has a new paper MMT, Sovereign Currencies And The Eurozone. It’s based on a lecture he was asked to give in 2021 STOREP conference. In this he analyses what neochartalism (“MMT”) is and what is says about the Euro Area.

Marc Lavoie also discusses Sergio Cesaratto’s work. Sergio had an excellent book Heterodox Challenges In Economics: Theoretical Issues And The Crisis Of The Eurozone and I somehow missed Marc’s review of it earlier.

My view on these issues—with good grasp of the institutional details—is that countries face a balance-of-payments constraint and the way the Euro Area is set up makes the balance-of-payments constraint stronger. Euro Area countries can no longer devalue their currencies (or hope their currencies depreciate by market forces) and the government can’t make overdrafts on their central banks.

It’s true that the European Central Bank (ECB) can buy government bonds but that it can doesn’t mean it actually will do to the extent needed. Indeed, the ECB has also pushed for tightening of fiscal policy using its powers. Countries face a BOP problem because like in other institutional setups, they’re at the mercy of foreigners. In fact more it’s more than otherwise in case of the Euro Area. And international indebtedness ultimately falls on the shoulders of the governments and hence we saw crisis in the government bond markets.

Countries with a strong international investment position such as Germany do not face this problem.

Ultimately, the problem is that the Euro Area doesn’t have a central government which would be involved in large fiscal transfers and keeping imbalances between countries in check. But as Sergio Cesaratto argues, it was never meant to be that way as the founders of the Euro Area designed it in a way to take away powers from national governments.

I should add one question which arises: the question about the political role of the ECB, which is similar to the role of governments in other places such as the US. There seems to be an inconsistency in the position of people such as Sergio (and I) that we treat the ECB and the US government differently. We say that the US government should be involved in more fiscal stimulus but don’t exactly say that the problems of the Euro Area can be resolved by proposing that the ECB promises to purchase government bonds without limits.

The answer to that is: even outside the Euro Area, rich countries’ central banks can bail out poor countries facing balance-of-payments financing problems. Does that mean that countries outside the Euro Area don’t face a bop-constraint??

It’s a rhetorical question posed as an answer.

Ultimately the balance-of-payments problems in the Euro Area is more severe than otherwise.

Where does neochartalism (“MMT” or “M.M.T.”) fit in my description? The idea that Euro Area governments cannot make overdrafts at their national central banks (NCBs) is something stressed by neochartalists is right but many authors who didn’t call themselves MMTers stressed this such as Wynne Godley in 1992. The idea that current account deficits don’t matter isn’t useful as you still have to explain why Germany didn’t go into a crisis like Greece.

Link

Sergio Cesaratto’s New Book

Sergio Cesaratto has a new book which:

  • Introduces readers to the basics of heterodox and orthodox approaches in economics
  • Explains the problematic aspects of the European Monetary Union (EMU) from the standpoint of alternative economic theories
  • Highlights the conservative nature of the EMU and the economic and political difficulties of reforming it

with the further description:

This book discloses the economic foundations of European fiscal and monetary policies by introducing readers to an array of alternative approaches in economics. It presents various heterodox theories put forward by classical economists, Marx, Sraffa and Keynes, as a coherent challenge to neo-classical theory. The book underscores and critically assesses the analytical inconsistencies of European economic policy and the conservative nature of the current European governance. In this light, it examines the political obstacles to proposals to reform the European monetary union, as well as those originating in the neo-mercantilist German model. Given its scope and format, the book offers a valuable asset for researchers and members of the general public alike.

[the title is the book site at Springer]

Tony Benn On The EU

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The Euro Area’s response to the covid-19 crisis is austere. This might lead to more dissatisfaction with the European Union project as many are predicting.

Yanis Varoufakis has been more critical of the Euro Area and the European Union in general in recent times, although he says he is in the team which wants to reform the EU from within. In a recent interview with Unherd, he makes it clear why the UK Labour lost the recent election: the push for a second referendum wasn’t liked by the voters and vote was a backlash against them.

Anyway I found a great clip from Tony Benn, the great leader of Labour, and it’s clear how the EU was hated by the left-wing but that it’s different now, unfortunately.

Tony Benn, in Parliament, 1990 (53:00 in the full video, clipped below):

Is the Prime Minister aware that what we are really discussing is not economic management, but the whole future of relations between this country and Europe? This issue is not best expressed in 19th-century patriotic language or in emotive language about which design is on the currency. The real question is whether, when the British people vote in a general election, they will be able to change the policies of the previous Government. It is already a fact, as the House knows full well, that whatever Government are in power, our agricultural policy is controlled from Brussels, our trade policy is controlled from Brussels and our industrial policy is controlled from Brussels. If we go into EMU, our financial policy will also be controlled. It is a democratic argument, not a nationalistic argument.

However, given that the right hon. Lady is a member of the Government who took us into the European Community without consulting the British people, given that she was Prime Minister in the Government who agreed to the Single European Act without consulting the British people, and given that she has now agreed to joining the exchange rate mechanism without consulting the British people, we find it hard to believe that she is really intent on preserving democracy rather than gaining political advantage by waving some national argument around on the eve of a general election. That is why we do not trust her judgment on the matter.

click to view the clip

There are many clips of Tony Benn on the EU on YouTube, but this is my favourite.

Link

Ashoka Mody: Kaldor’s Ghost Is Stalking The Eurozone

Ashoka Mody has done excellent historical work in his book Eurotragedy — A Drama in Nine Acts. Excerpt from his interview with Spiked, reminding us of the wonderful prediction of Nicky Kaldor from 1971:

spiked: When I’ve been to Italy recently I’m struck by the instances of anti-German grafitti. Do you think that one of the greatest ironies of this project of supposed economic and political integration is that it has actually fostered enmity among European nations, rather than unity?

Mody: As I said, Nicholas Kaldor predicted exactly that in 1971. He said that a single currency will amplify existing economic divergences, and, if it does that, it will deepen political divisions. He even quoted Abraham Lincoln: ‘A house divided against itself cannot stand.’ Kaldor’s ghost is stalking the Eurozone.

Sergio Cesaratto — Alternative Interpretations Of A Stateless Currency Crisis

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I recently referred to a paper by Sergio Cesaratto on the Euro Area crisis. There is another paper, Alternative Interpretations Of A Stateless Currency Crisis, written for the Cambridge Journal Of Economics, written last year which I somehow missed referring on this site.

CJE link (no paywall at the time of writing), Wayback Machine link.

Abstract:

A number of economists warned that a political union was a prerequisite for a viable currency union. This paper disputes the feasibility of such a political union. A fully fledged federal union, which would likely please peripheral Europe, is impracticable since it implies a degree of fiscal solidarity that does not exist. A Hayekian minimal federal state, which would appeal to core Europe, would be refused by peripheral members, since residual fiscal sovereignty would be surrendered without any clear positive economic and social return. Even an intermediate solution based on coordinated Keynesian policies would be unfeasible, since it would be at odds with German ‘monetary mercantilism’. The euro area is thus trapped between equally unfeasible political perspectives. In this bleak context, austerity policies are mainly explained by the necessity to readdress the euro area balance-of-payments crisis. This crisis presents striking similarities to traditional financial crises in emerging economies associated with fixed exchange regimes. Therefore, the delayed response of the European Central Bank (ECB) to the sovereign debt crisis cannot be seen as the culprit of the euro area crisis. The ECB’s monetary refinancing mechanisms, Target 2 and the ECB’s belated Outright Monetary Transactions intervention impeded a blow-up of the currency union, but could not solve its deep causes. The current combination of austerity policies and moderate ECB intervention aims to rebalance intra-eurozone foreign accounts and to force competitive deflation strategy.

As the abstract says, the ECB alone cannot resolve the crisis.

I agree almost everything in the paper except that in my opinion, a political union—a central government—is the only way to solve the Euro crisis. But Sergio’s arguments about his view are solid.

My Favourite Chart, Updated: Euro Area Imbalances

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With crisis in Italy, the Euro Area is back in news! But it is not just Italy, the crisis is far from over, as this chart from Eurostat—my favourite—illustrates:

Euro Area Net International Investment Position

EA19, Net International Investment Position

The Euro Area doesn’t have a central government with large fiscal powers and hence there is nothing to keep imbalances in check. So some countries—with no fault of theirs—accumulated large debts. The net international investment position captures the financial position of a country. If it is positive, it is a creditor to the world, if it is negative it is a debtor of the world. If NIIP/GDP is large negative, then there is a problem. It’s difficult to say how large it can go, since it depends on how long markets and official institutions allow it to go. The need to keep it sustainable puts a downward pressure on GDP.

As Nicholas Kaldor wrote in The Dynamic Effects Of The Common Market, in the New Statesman, 12 March 1971:

… the objective of a full monetary and economic union is unattainable without a political union; and the latter pre-supposes fiscal integration, and not just fiscal harmonisation. It requires the creation of a Community Government and Parliament which takes over the responsibility for at least the major part of the expenditure now provided by national governments and finances it by taxes raised at uniform rates throughout the Community. With an integrated system of this kind, the prosperous areas automatically subside the poorer areas; and the areas whose exports are declining obtain automatic relief by paying in less, and receiving more, from the central Exchequer. The cumulative tendencies to progress and decline are thus held in check by a “built-in” fiscal stabiliser which makes the “surplus” areas provide automatic fiscal aid to the “deficit” areas.

Sergio Cesaratto — The Nature Of The Eurocrisis: A Reply To Febrero, Uxó And Bermejo

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Recently I commented on a paper, The Financial Crisis In The Eurozone: A Balance-Of-Payments Crisis With A Single Currency? by Eladio Febrero, Jorge Uxó and Fernando Bermejo, published in ROKE, Review Of Keynesian Economics. I hadn’t realised that Sergio Cesaratto has a reply (paywalled) in the same issue.

Sergio Cesaratto

Sergio Cesaratto. Picture credit: La Città Futura, Sergio Cesaratto

Abstract:

Febrero et al. (2018) criticise the balance-of-payments (BoP) view of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) crisis. I have no major objections to most of the single aspects of the crisis pointed out by these authors, except that they appear to underline specific sides of the EMU crisis, while missing a unifying and realistic explanation. Specific semi-automatic mechanisms differentiate a BoP crisis in a currency union from a traditional one. Unfortunately, these mechanisms give Febrero et al. the illusion that a BoP crisis in a currency union is impossible. My conclusion is that an interpretation of the eurozone’s troubles as a BoP crisis provides a more consistent framework. The debate has some relevance for the policy prescriptions to solve the eurocrisis. Given the costs that all sides would incur if the currency union were to break up, austerity policies are still seen by European politicians as a tolerable price to pay to keep foreign imbalances at bay – with the sweetener of some European Central Bank (ECB) support, for as long as Berlin allows the ECB to provide it.

Sergio carefully responds to all views of Febrero et al. and Marc Lavoie, Randall Wray and also Paul De Grauwe, pointing out that he agrees with most of their views except that their dismissal of this being a balance-of-payments crisis with their claims that the problem could have been addressed by the Eurosystem/ECB lending to governments without limits. He points out that, “The austerity measures that accompanied the ECB’s more proactive stance are clearly to police a moral hazard problem”. It is true that the ECB, the European Commission and the IMF overdid the austerity but it doesn’t mean that Sergio’s opponents’ claims are accurate.