Tag Archives: free trade

Industrial Policy And Global Tax Coordination: Some Changes In How The World Is Run

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Senate Poised To Pass Huge Industrial Policy Bill To Counter China is the headline of a recent news item from The New York Times.

US politicians have come to realise—especially after the rise of Trump—that free trade and globalisation is a major cause of damage to the US economy. The purpose of industrial policy is to make US producers more competitive. This results in increase of exports and fall in imports, relative to gdp.

Wynne Godley had been warning for quite some time on how the US government should address the trade imbalance instead of leaving it to market forces. In March 2003, in an article The U.S. Economy: A Changing Strategic Predicament he said:

The default conclusion is that the U.S. economy will not recover properly in the medium term, but rather will enter a prolonged period of “growth recession.” The only lasting solution will be to get U.S. exports to rise much faster than imports over a prolonged period.

And also suggested non-selected protectionism for the short term.

Another recent news article from NYT is about a global tax coordination. Globalisation has led to a race to the bottom. To raise price competitiveness, countries have been wrongly incentivised to reduce tax rates on firms and this led to some competition between countries to keep reducing tax rates on corporations. And this has led to lot of economic damage.

The Democratic Party of the US has learned from mistakes in the past and is trying to correct them but the Dems are total corporatists and these measures are just for elite preservation. For example, they were talking of reversing Trump’s tax cuts for corporations but the party is a champion in performative politics: it seems they’re not reversing it now.

As Joseph Stiglitz points out, the problem with this 15% tax rate is that it become the de facto the maximum tax rate.

In his last paper, Wynne Godley said on rebalancing:

It is inconceivable that such a large rebalancing could occur without a drastic change in the institutions responsible for running the world economy—a change that would involve placing far less than total reliance on market forces.

Although the steps taken by the US government looks in the right direction, there’s still a large way to go, especially considering how the Democrats pretend to do all sorts of good things. Still far from a Keynes like plan to fine surplus countries and to remove imbalances in balance of payments and international investment position.

Link

Perry Anderson On Brexit

The new issue of New Left Review is out and Perry Anderson has a 73-page essay on British state and society.

Some good description of Brexit:

In 2015, Cameron was returned to office without need of the Liberal Democrats, who were decimated at the polls, and in the wake of Labour’s renewed defeat, Corbyn was elected its leader in the first one-person-one-vote election in the party’s history. Within a year came the referendum, called and lost by Cameron on Britain’s membership of the EU.32 His decision to call one, product of long-standing divisions among the Tories, was designed to silence the Eurosceptic wing of his party, in a careless display of class insouciance that with united establishment support—extending from the City to the TUC, not to speak of all-party backing—victory was assured. But as in France and the Netherlands, a popular rebellion against the whole governing class led to the opposite outcome. Two thirds of the working class voted for Leave, a higher proportion than any stratum—including even the best-off—voting for Remain, on a larger turn-out than seen in years. London, beneficiary of the financial bubble and closer to Paris than Manchester by rail, voted heavily for Remain; the abandoned industrial North, hardest-hit by austerity, heavily for Leave. On the left, opinions had divided. Those in favour of Remain argued that the xenophobia of Brexiteers of the right made the EU a lesser evil, those in favour of Leave that departure would be a blow to the neo-liberal oligarchies on both sides of the Channel: each voting negatively against, rather than for, anything. But what would Brexit actually mean for the European Union, or for Ukania in parting with it? So far, all that was clear was that ‘Blairized Britain has taken a hit, as has the Hayekianized EU’ and ‘critics of the neoliberal order have no reason to regret these knocks to it’, against which the entire global establishment had inveighed.

More fine-grained analysis made clear the extent to which the Brexit result, though certainly multi-stranded in motivation, was the expression of a regional and social revolt in the North of England: Leave majorities were concentrated in former strongholds of Labour, now reduced to a hinterland of decayed industries and discarded proletarian households.33 There was hostility to immigrants in this part of the country, as elsewhere in Britain. However, that it was not the primary driver of the outcome could be deduced from Labour’s unexpected recovery in the election of 2017, once Corbyn campaigned on a platform amounting to a rejection of the whole neo-liberal order in place since the 1980s. In the face of a high Tory vote, he not only held most of the North, but swept the youth of the country by margins never previously approached by Labour, in what was now a second popular uprising against the entire British establishment. Yet Corbyn’s position remained tenuous in his own party, whose permanent apparatus and parliamentary delegation remained ferociously opposed to him.34 The small team around him lacked any preparation for government in what would be the predictable conditions of an implacable siege by capital and the media. There were no grounds for euphoria.

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Britain’s liberal market economy—read: secular eversion—generated the two-fold revolt that produced Brexit. The victory of Brexit led to Conservative capture of a majority of the working class. Working-class expectations require concessions from a suddenly altered Conservative regime that Brexit impedes. The desertion of its proletarian base leaves Labour sociologically adrift in the eddies of a protean middle class. Its share of the middle class is attached to Europe, no part of it more passionately than the liberal intelligentsia. Attracted towards Labour by its stance in the cultural war over Europe, the English intelligentsia is alienated from it by what became of its own principal habitat under it. In Scotland, alienation of all classes of society from Labour has given power to a nationalism looking to Europe. Departure from Europe has both inflamed Scottish nationalism and entrapped it. The price of departure, indexed by the EU to political not economic considerations, has left Britain’s rulers answerless politically and, in all probability, the wells of Brexit further poisoned economically. No part of the current configuration is independent of the others. Their nexus is bound to dissolve, in one way or another. When or how is anyone’s guess.

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32 Susan Watkins, ‘Casting Off?’, NLR 100, July–August 2016.

33 Tom Hazeldine, ‘Revolt of the Rustbelt’, NLR 105, May–June 2017.

34 Daniel Finn, ‘Crosscurrents’, NLR 118, July–August 2019.

New Left Review, 125

Wynne Godley On Control Of International Trade

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From Alan Shipman’s biography, Wynne Godley, A Biography, Chapter 9: Balance Of Payments, Deindustrialisation And Protection, page 151:

Of all Godley’s policy prescriptions, direct import controls were the one most roundly rejected by other economists, and least likely to be adopted by politicians with any chance of gaining power. The accusation of advocating a policy that was economically illogical, politically infeasible and inadmissible in international law hurt deeply, but never crushed his belief that import quotas should be seriously considered as an additional macroeconomic instrument. The depth of the wound emerged in an unusually personal statement to a 1978 conference on ‘Slow Growth in Britain’, convened by Oxford University’s Wilfred Beckerman in Bath. ‘I am disconcerted and distressed to find myself, together with the group of people with whom I work in Cambridge, in such an isolated position. For we seem to be the only group of professional economists who entertain the possibility that control of international trade may be the only way of recovering and maintaining the prosperity of this country; that free trade may be an enemy for the relatively weak’ (Godley 1979: 226).

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References

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Godley, W. (1979). Britain’s chronic recession—Can anything be done? In W. Beckerman (Ed.), Slow Growth in Britain. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Keynes said that:

A study of the history of opinion is a necessary preliminary to the emancipation of the mind.

Although in the poor countries, ones colonised and which suffered because of imposition of laissez-faire, there have been a lot of opposition to free trade—and those voices aren’t heard through silencing internationally—in the advanced countries, it has been almost non-existent except from Cambridge Keynesians and maybe a few others. In recent times, we see some opposition, but not remotely like this even 40 years ago. It is important to know the history of thought to understand how hegemonic the ruling ideology has been.

For Wynne Godley, dissenting against free trade was one of the most important reasons for his dissent against the profession. In his short autobiography written in 2001 for A Biographical Dictionary Of Dissenting Economists, Godley said:

There are two aspects (in particular) of the work of the CEPG [Cambridge Economic Policy Group] which put its members into a category which may he termed ‘dissenting’. The first – a matter mainly of concern to the modelling fraternity and academic econometricians – was the unconventional view we took about how to construct and use an econometric model.

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The second, and more egregious, respect in which we became a ‘dissident’ group was that, as a result of trying to think through the possible ways in which Britain’s net export demand might be improved, we entertained the possibility that international trade should be, in some sense, ‘managed’. There might, we argued, be no way in which the adverse trends could be reversed other than some form of control of imports. Our argument (see for instance Cripps, 1978; Cripps and Godley, 1978) was never one in favour of protectionism as normally understood – that is, the selective and unilateral protection of relatively failing industries under conditions of general stagnation. On the contrary, we were most careful to lay down conditions under which the management of trade would benefit not only our own country (without making its industry less efficient) but would also increase the level of trade and output in the rest of the world. The two basic principles were, first, that trade management should reduce import propensities without ever reducing imports themselves (in total) below what they otherwise would have been; and, second, that ‘protection’ should be as minimally selective as possible (for example, through the use of market mechanisms such as auction quotas) so that industrial inefficiency would not be sponsored.

I was surprised by the hostility with which our ideas about trade were received. It seemed to me at the time, and still seems to me, that the arguments actually used against us (at their most coherent by Maurice Scott et al., 1980) did not, in practice, rest on a well-articulated theoretical position but on very special assumptions about behavioural relationships and international political responses. (I have, to the best of my ability, answered these particular points in Christodoulakis and Godley, 1987.)

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The ‘dissident’ argument in favour of managed trade is well summarized in Kaldor (1980), where he points out that the modern theory of international trade is based on the assumption that all production takes place according to the conditions described by the neoclassical production function, with constant returns to scale. Kaldor postulated instead, and he was surely right to do so, that the principle of circular and cumulative causation leads (through dynamically increasing returns) to a process, not of convergence, but of polarization between successful and unsuccessful economies in which success in competitive performance feeds on itself and losers become immiserated by trade.

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Godley’s Major Writings

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(1978), ‘Control of Imports as a Means to Full Employment: The UK’s Case’ (with T.F.
Cripps), Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2, September.

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(1987), ‘A Dynamic Model for the Analysis of Trade Policy Options’ (with N. Christodoulakis), Journal of Policy Modelling, 9.

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Other References

Cripps, T.F. (1978), ‘Causes of Growth and Recession in World Trade’, Cambridge Economic Policy Review, No. 4.

Kaldor, N. (1980), ‘The Foundations of Free Trade Theory and Recent Experiences’, in E. Malinvaud and Fitoussi, J.P. (eds), Unemployment in Western Countries, London: Macmillan.

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Scott, M., Corden, W.M. and Little, I.M.D. (1980), The Case Against Import Controls (Thames Essay No. 24), London: Trade Policy Research Centre.

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Joan Robinson On How Free Trade Is Destructive

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Joan Robinson in her 1977 paper What Has Become Of Employment Policy on how free trade has been destructive and leads to divergence of fortunes of countries. Also in Collected Economic Papers, Vol V. Relevant text (with footnotes and quoted references in the same text) reproduced below, with my highlights:

II

Class war was not the only element of inherent vice in the free-market system to disturb the age of growth. There were also the problems generated by the unevenness of development amongst various capitalist nations and the economic and political relationships between industrial countries and primary producers, particularly those in the third world.

The pre-Keynesian theory of international trade required the balance of imports and exports for each country to be maintained by movements in relative price levels. After experiencing the attempt to return to the gold standard in 1925 (see Keynes, 1972), Keynes adopted the view that depreciating the exchange rate was much to be preferred to attempting to depress the price level. At the end of his life, feeling obliged to defend the Bretton Woods agreement against his better judgement (Kahn, 1976), he lapsed into arguing that, in the long run, market forces would tend to establish equilibrium in international trade (Keynes, 1946). He had forgotten his old crack, that in the long run we are all dead.

As it turned out, market forces generated disequilibrium. Differences in competitive power, whatever their origin, set up a spiral of divergence. A country such as West Germany, with growing exports, could maintain a high rate of investment and therefore of growing productivity, which enhanced its competitive power, and allowed real wages to rise so that workers were less demanding. In the United Kingdom, any increase in employment caused an increase in the deficit in the balance of payments so that every hopeful go had to be brought to an end with a despairing stop. Thus strong competitors grow stronger and the weak, weaker.

Because of the size and strength of the United States and its overseas economy, trade plays a small part in national income, but not a small part in the world market. The USA can move from deficit to surplus without much disturbance at home, but with a great deal of disturbance to the other trading nations. Moreover, it was able to take advantage of the dollar being the world currency to run an ever greater outflow on capital account with an ever growing deficit on income account, until President Nixon, with the dollar devaluation of 1971, suddenly tried to reverse the position with a stroke of the pen. All this laid great strains on the international monetary system.

Keynes worked out the structure of the General Theory mainly in terms of a closed economy. When it is extended to take in the operation of international economic relations, a missing link appears in the argument. The rate of interest was to be used to regulate home investment, and Keynes believed that a secular fall in interest rates was both necessary for this purpose and desirable in itself. Exchange rates were to offset differences in relative labour costs. Then nothing would be left to regulate short-term capital movements. Traditionally this was the function of relative interest rates. Britain, and other countries with chronically weak payments balances, could not indulge in cheap money however much home conditions required it, and had to follow the interest rates of other countries up whenever they happened to rise. This was one more turn in the spiral of weakness weakening itself.

Over and above the strains set up by the uneasy relationships amongst the industrial nations themselves, there were the strains involved in the relations of the industrial countries as a whole and the third world. The formation of prices in the free-market system is in two parts—cost-plus in manufacturing industry and supply and demand for primary products.† A rise in the level of production and consumption in industrial countries normally increases demand for all kinds of primary products. When prices of materials rise, while money wage rates are constant, real wages fall and so generate a demand for rising money wages, which adds to the original rise in costs. Thus favourable terms of trade reduce class conflict in the industrial countries and unfavourable terms exacerbate it.

Commodity prices responded sharply to the pressure of demand during the Korean war boom, but this was soon over and during the 1950s the terms of trade moved in favour of industrial countries. However, the long boom, swollen by the Vietnam war, financed by the USA on the principle of guns and butter, caused an acceleration in the rate of increase in commodity prices and finally sparked off the great inflation of 1973.

In an economic model, it is possible to analyse the consequences of any one change by keeping other things constant. In real life a lot of things happen at once. During the long boom, an excess of demand over growth of capacity led to shortages of one commodity after another. The demonetisation of the dollar in 1971 drove speculative funds into commodity markets. The Moslem oil producers, temporarily bound together by hostility to Israel, suddenly realised the extent of their monopoly power. Inflation at what now seems a mild and acceptable rate had been going on for years all over the capitalist world, setting up expectations that inflation would continue and undermining the conventional belief that a dollar is a dollar. Injected into this situation, the sudden rise in the costs of materials, especially oil, blew the inflation sky high.

This concatenation of circumstances has been described as a historical accident. But it is the inherent vice in the free-market system of international trade which creates the setting for such ‘accidents’, from which it has no means to defend itself except by destroying prosperity and depriving the primary product sellers of their favourable terms of trade.

III

The hopes which accompanied the Keynesian revolution, of reforming capitalism so as to ensure continuous prosperity with full employment, are now all but extinguished. The slide into crisis in the capitalist world has re-established the pre-Keynesian orthodoxy as the conventional wisdom in economic policy-making at both national and international levels. The inevitable consequence of this is a much higher general level of unemployment and recurrent crises, involving a massive waste of resources and considerable human misery.

Important changes in the world economy have taken place over the last two decades, which have ended the era of near-full employment and exposed the inadequacies of the conventional Keynesian analysis. One of the most important of these developments has been the relaxation of tariffs and exchange controls and the resulting large increase in international trade‡ and capital movements; this has increasingly exposed national economies to the ravages of uncontrolled capitalist competition, in the way that they were exposed before the 1930s.

While the USA remained the predominant world economic and political power, and effectively acted as the world central bank, some semblance of order in international economic relations was retained. The use of the dollar as a reserve currency and the eagerness of the USA to lend abroad allowed international liquidity to expand to meet the needs of the growing volume of trade and facilitated post-war reconstruction and structural adaptation in the capitalist world. But with the emergence of Japan and western European countries as strong competitors to the USA, and the deterioration of the USA’s balance of payments, unhindered capital movements became a major destabilising force. The IMF proved totally inadequate to its appointed task of protecting national economies from external shocks and assisting the correction of more permanent imbalances in payments. In fact, by establishing rules which threw the burden of adjustment mainly onto deficit countries, the IMF institutionalised an important element in the process of unequal development among capitalist countries.

Faced with growing international pressures, the governments of debtor countries have been obliged to adopt the deflationary policies acceptable to their creditors (including the IMF); policies which conflicted with the avowed aim of maintaining full employment and with the real-wage demands of the working class. Thus democratically elected governments of debtor countries, where the working class is well organised, have walked a knife edge between the international and internal disapproval of their economic policies. But the frequently imposed deflationary policies progressively weakened the competitive position of such economies, increasing their indebtedness and reducing the opportunities for advances in real wages. Unable to meet either internal or external demands, economic policy vacillated wildly; consequently growing economic crisis has been accompanied by increasing political instability and further destabilisation of the international economy.

The world market system has run into a second, and much more general, impasse, caught between two interlocking conflicts—the demands of workers in the industrial countries for higher real wages and the demands of the third world for improved terms of trade.

So long as unemployment and slow growth continue, the relative prices of raw materials are kept down and this somewhat mitigates inflation in industrial countries. As soon as a revival begins, prices of raw materials and foodstuffs begin to go up and real wage demands become harder to resist; the authorities nervously pull back and the revival is checked. The orthodox economists, still repeating incantations about equilibrium, encourage the authorities to pursue these deflationary policies—the very same that Keynes in the thirties used to describe as sadistic.

It is ironic that after the great technical achievements brought by the age of growth, all we are offered is a return to large-scale unemployment and poverty in the midst of plenty, in an age of frustration. Kalecki was right to be sceptical; the modern economies have failed to develop the political and social institutions, at either domestic or international level, that are needed to make permanent full employment compatible with capitalism.

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† See Robinson (1962); K. J. Coutts, W. A. H. Godley and W. D. Nordhaus, Industrial Pricing in the United Kingdom, Cambridge, CUP, forthcoming.

‡ Exports of OECD countries as a whole increased from 11% of GDP in 1954 to almost 17% of GDP in 1973.

References

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Kahn, R. 1976. The historical origins of the IMF, in Keynes and International Monetary Relations, ed. H. P. Thirlwall, London, Macmillan

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Keynes, J. M. 1946. The balance of payments of the United States, Economic Journal, vol. 56

Keynes, J. M. 1972. The economic consequences of Mr Winston Churchill, in Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 9, Essays in Persuasion, London, Macmillan

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Joan Robinson On International Trade In Times Of International Crisis

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Nick Johnson has some good quotes from Joan Robinson’s book Freedom & Necessity — An Introduction To The Study Of Society from 1970.

One for the current times, Chapter 9, The New Mercantilism, page 92:

The national egoism of modern capitalism is clearly seen in the sphere of international trade. The capitalist world (except in a major war) is a buyer’s market. Productive capacity exceeds demand. Exports yield profits and imports (apart from necessary raw materials) mean a loss of sales to competitors. Moreover internal investment is easier to foster, inflation easier to fend off and the foreign exchange easier to manage in a situation of a favourable balance of trade — that is, an excess of exports over imports. Thus every nation competes to achieve ‘export-led growth’, while each tries to defend itself from the exports of the others. The combination of national quasi-planning with international chaos (which the agreements on trade and finance made after the war have not succeeded in mastering) flares up from time to time in an international crisis.

Joan Robinson was one of the first economists to be against free trade.

In the book Aspects Of Development And Underdevelopment, 1979, Chapter 6, Dependent Industrialisation, page 102, she says:

The most pervasive and strongly held of all neoclassical doctrines is that of the universal benefits of free trade, but unfortunately the theory in terms of which it is expounded has no relevance to the question that it purports to discuss. The argument is conducted in terms of comparisons of static equilibrium positions in which each trading nation is enjoying full employment of all resources and balanced payments, the flow of exports, valued at world prices, being equal to the flow of imports. In such conditions, there is no motive for resorting to protection of home industry. Since full employment of given resources is assumed, there is no need for protection to increase home industry, and since timeless equilibrium is assumed there can never be a deficit in the balance of payments. Moreover, since all countries are treated as having the same level of development, there can be no question of ‘unequal exchange’.

Of course one of the best is the 1937 article Beggar-My-Neighbour Remedies For Unemployment.

Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven On The Dependency Research Program

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Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven has a new paper Beyond The Stereotype: Restating The Relevance Of The Dependency Research Programme in the journal Development And Change in which argues for the high importance of “dependency theory” which she wants to call a research programme.

There’s a good Twitter thread by her summarising the paper.

The central idea of the theoretical framework is that:

core countries benefit from the global system at the expense of periphery countries, which face structural barriers that make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to develop in the same way that the core countries did.

And from the summary at the end:

… defining dependency theory as a research programme provides an alternative way of categorizing dependency scholarship that captures the breadth of the scholarship as well as its strengths. This research programme — characterized by 1) theorization on the persistence of uneven development; with a focus on 2) the specific constraints peripheral countries face; and 3) structures of production; with 4) a global historical approach to these issues — provides a foundation from which to fruitfully explore important questions related to development and global inequality.

Although, the paper doesn’t mention the name of Nicholas Kaldor, I look at such issues using his work, and agree quite a bit with the dependency research programme.

Planned Trade

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The latest edition of The Economist has this cover, worrying about the rise in the idea of national self-sufficiency.

Obviously, The Economist whose purpose is to promote the propaganda of free trade doesn’t like this as any country achieving self-sufficiency would mean a reduction of market share of large corporations whose interests the magazine has spoken since 1843, the year it was founded.

John Maynard Keynes wondered about national-self sufficiency too. In an article titled National Self-Sufficiency in the year 1933, which he argued:

Of course self-sufficiency is one thing, but there’s also the idea of planned trade. These two concepts are related but are potentially different.

One of the promoters of planned trade was Nicholas Kaldor. In The Role Of Increasing Returns, Technical Progress And Cumulative Causation In The Theory Of International Trade And Economic Growth, Economie Appliquée, 34(4): 593–617, 1981, he motivates the reasons for a planned trade:

At the moment the world suffers from an insufficiency of demand for industrial products which most industrial countries however are not in a position to remedy, because of the need to avoid deficits in their balance of payments. It does not follow therefore that free trade leads to the maximum development of trade: if it involves chronic imbalances it might lead to a situation in which the world economy is in a state of continued recession, which cannot be effectively counterbalanced by national policies of economic management. Most governments and economists are in constant fear lest the state of recession will lead to the haphazard introduction of protective measures to domestic industries, which on balance will cause a further shrinkage of world demand. This may well happen in the absence of a coordinated policy, but my own prescription would not be that we must stick to free trade (whatever the cost), but to introduce a system of planned trade between the industrially developing countries, so as to remove the balance of payment constraint on their internal expansion.11

Contrary to the actual policies adopted—which put trade restrictions mostly on imports from low wage developing countries—I would allow such imports freely since these countries have an unlimited appetite for manufactured imports of capital goods, which is only restrained by their ability to pay for them. Contrary to the general view, therefore, it is not the imports coming from the developing countries, but the import penetration of goods produced in developed countries which threatens major industries of other developed countries (such as the motor car industry in Britain or the television industry in the U.S.) and which requires some system of regulation of trade if we wish to remove existing impediments for the expansion of production and employment in the industrial countries of the world.12

11 The French Government in the year preceding the legislative election, under the leadership of M. Barre, advocated something similar with their slogan “Croissance ordonnée des échanges”. It is possible however that it was a temporary slogan for the sake of electoral popularity since not much was heard about these policies after the last French elections.

12 It also requires the recycling of OPEC surpluses—a function which has been performed up to now, not by official institutions such as the IMF, but mainly American private banks, operating through the Euro-dollar market. While I have no time to develop this theme on the present occasion, I think I ought to mention that I would favour as an instrument of such planning the introduction of some licensing system for imports of manufactures which is directly linked to exports, so that imports and exports are kept in some agreed balance.

Basically in the regime of free trade, the market mechanism does not bring balance-of-payments imbalances in balance. The price mechanism to keep global imbalances in check simply doesn’t work. Instead it works by putting a deflationary bias on the whole world.

Hence there is a need for using official mechanisms to keep imbalances in check without output suffering.

Asymmetric Protectionism

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Imperialism and free-trade is the most important reason for why some countries are rich and others poor. Because of the principle of circular and cumulative causation, they rarely catch up. Poor countries aren’t “underdeveloped”—it’s a misleading word—they’re exploited. Hence there’s a need for global rules to allow for convergence of fortunes of nations. The current rules of globalisation lead to polarisation and welfare of a few, not the many.

I recently recommended Ha-Joon Chang’s lecture series. It’s a long one—13 lectures followed by discussions.

In the discussion part of the talk Why Are Some Countries Rich And Others Poor, Ha-Joon Chang calls for asymmetric protectionism. The global rules are in favour of poor countries and not the rich ones.

Nicholas Kaldor was proposing “planned trade” in the 70s and the 80s and also a plan to have balanced trade. So a part of planned trade would be to allow poor countries to use tariffs and quotas without the fear of retaliation by rich countries.

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Jason Hickel Features Again On Citations Needed

The latest episode of the podcast Citations Needed features Jason Hickel again who together with the hosts Nima Shirazi and Adam Johnson explain how the mainstream narrative hides the correct story about success and failure of nations by spreading the wrong idea that corruption is the main factor.

Jason Hickel: So, of course I teach on global economics and, and one of the questions I like to ask my students at the beginning of term is something along the lines of, okay, so we have this massive inequality between global north and global south, rich countries and poor countries, why do you think poor countries are so poor? And I would say, you know, 80 and 90 percent of the students will put their hands up and say they believe it’s because of corruption, you know, because the global south has corrupts leaders. But the problem with that story is it erases, you know, the history of colonization, the history of structural adjustments, the history of unfair trade arrangements. And so it’s a very de-politicized way of thinking about the drivers of impoverishment because the focus is solely on the nation states as opposed to the relationships between nation states and geopolitical regions of the world. And that’s really what I want to draw attention to.

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