Tag Archives: wynne godley

Charts From OECD’s Economic Outlook

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The OECD released its Economic Outlook recently. The preview is available here but download is for subscribers. Else if you are an FT subscriber, you can get it from FT Alphaville’s Long Room.

A few interesting charts (at least for me):

(click to enlarge)

Most Economists (except a few good ones), following the work of Mundell, Fleming and Friedman believed that in floating exchange rate regimes, the invisible hand will work to remove imbalances. Unfortunately, this has not happened and it has taken the crisis for them (most of them actually!) to realize that there is no mechanism and it is still unclear if they understand this.

There are some dissenters among Post Keynesians, such as Randall Wray, who do not consider current account deficits as an imbalance. See this blog post. Also see Reserve Bank of Australia’s Guy Dibelle’s speech In Defense of Current Account Deficits from July 2011.

An intuition I see often displayed in blogs is that these numbers are small and hence not problematic! My view is that these imbalances are kept low by keeping demand low. More importantly, these imbalances (deficits) add to the stock of external debt (because a deficit in the current account increases net indebtedness to foreigners) and this gets out of control sometimes leading to deflation of demand and/or seeking help from the IMF. So “low” imbalances accumulate to a huge net indebtedness.

There is an informative graph on the financing needs of Greece, Ireland and Portugal:

 The report also charts sectoral balances for the Euro Area!

(click to enlarge)

The Euro Area as a whole seems healthy, and it is imbalances within that are causing the troubles.

It seems Italy’s current account is worsening:

Turkey’s current account attracts a lot of attention and challenges look like this:

Turkey’s currency Lira has depreciated a lot recently

In Post Keynesian theory, the exchange rate is determined in a beauty contest in addition to demand and supply for financial assets.  Sudden movements can be very painful and hence nations face a balance of payments constraint – success of nations depends on how producers do in international markets. In words of Wynne Godley,

For growth to be sustainable, it is essential that the management of domestic demand be complemented by the management of foreign trade (by whatever policies) in such a way that the net balance of exports less imports contributes in parallel to the expansion of demand for home production.

At the global level, since not everyone can be net exporting, the problem of global imbalances affects everyone, and new changes are required on how the global economy is run.

Krugman, Wolf And Goodhart

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Paul Krugman has a blog  post today titled Death By Accounting Identity, commenting on Martin Wolf’s FT Article Why cutting fiscal deficits is an assault on profits, where Wolf talks about the sectoral balances identity made famous by Wynne Godley. I guess the better way to put it is that Martin Wolf is trying to make the accounting identity famous.

A Damascene Moment

In his book with Marc Lavoie, Wynne Godley wrote in his part of Background memories (by W.G.)

… In 1970 I moved to Cambridge, where, with Francis Cripps, I founded the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG). I remember a damascene moment when, in early 1974 (after playing round with concepts devised in conversation with Nicky Kaldor and Robert Neild), I first apprehended the strategic importance of the accounting identity which says that, measured at current prices, the government’s budget deficit less the current account deficit is equal, by definition, to private saving net of investment. Having always thought of the balance of trade as something which could only be analysed in terms of income and price elasticities together with real output movements at home and abroad, it came as a shock to discover that if only one knows what the budget deficit and private net saving are, it follows from that information alone, without any qualification whatever, exactly what the balance of payments must be. Francis Cripps and I set out the significance of this identity as a logical framework both for modelling the economy and for the formulation of policy in the London and Cambridge Economic Bulletin in January 1974 (Godley and Cripps 1974). We correctly predicted that the Heath Barber boom would go bust later in the year at a time when the National Institute was in full support of government policy and the London Business School (i.e. Jim Ball and Terry Burns) were conditionally recommending further reflation! We also predicted that inflation could exceed 20% if the unfortunate threshold (wage indexation) scheme really got going interactively. This was important because it was later claimed that inflation (which eventually reached 26%) was the consequence of the previous rise in the ‘money supply’, while others put it down to the rising pressure of demand the previous year. …

I believe Wynne Godley discovered this identity while working for the British Treasury in the ’60s – at least the identity relating two sectors – domestic private sector and the government sector, but the damascene moment happened in 1974. The accounting identity is also used heavily in his 1983 book Macroeconomics, with Francis Cripps.

Charles Goodhart

Charles Goodhart also seems to be making use of the accounting identity (and a mental model built around this identity) in his recent Voxeu post Europe: After the Crisis. The difference is that in Charles Goodhart’s writing, fiscal policy is given less importance than monetary policy.

He talks of three implicit and incorrect assumptions:

  • The first, and most important, incorrect assumption was that a private-sector deficit in any country, matched by a capital inflow (current account deficit), should not be potentially destabilising.

The thinking was that the private sector must have worked out how to repay its debts before incurring them.

  • The second misguided assumption was that, in a single monetary system, local current account conditions not only cannot be calculated, but do not matter.
  • The third was that the public sector deficit of a member country is just as damaging when it is matched by a national private sector surplus, as by capital inflows.

I think each of these points is really insightful.

The first assumption is reminiscent of the economic agent in models who has a perfect foresight. The agent must have seen the future very well and would have calculated well in advance that things will go well. Consolidate all agents and we have the first assumption.

The second assumption is extremely well presented. People, especially economists asked – if the states in the United States used the same currency, why not Europe? The pitfall in this assumption is assuming away the U.S. Federal Government which makes fiscal transfers without anyone noticing.

The third assumption has to do with the lack of understanding the various causalities linking the three financial balances.Goodhart also goes into providing ideas for the design of “The fiscal counterpart to a monetary union”. One point I liked was on transfer dependency: 

For a stabilisa­tion instrument to be pure and effective, three principles are key (see Goodhart and Smith 1993 for details):

  • The instrument should be triggered following changes in economic activity but its intervention should be halted as soon as no further changes occur, irrespective of the level at which the economy has again become stable.

Otherwise, the instrument would perform not only a stabilisation function, but also play a redistribu­tive role. Such an ‘impurity’ is typical for traditional fiscal policy measures, but should be avoided in the Community context as it may perpetuate adjustment problems and induce transfer dependency.

….

Goodhart also makes a nice point on Japan – something (a part of it) you can see me writing in the Chartalists’ blogs’ comments section:

This analysis implies that the Eurozone needs a wholesale reorientation of the stability conditions. They must be refocused towards concern with external debt, and deficit, conditions and much less single-minded focus on the public sector finances.

If a member country is in a Japanese condition with a huge public-sector debt, but fully financed domestically, with a current-account surplus and large net external assets, then its debt should entirely be its own concern, and not subject to censure or control by any outside body, whether in a monetary union, or not. Of course, such greater attention to external, especially current-account, conditions needs to be more nuanced, since deficits, and external debts, incurred to finance tradeable goods production subsequently should provide the extra goods to sell to pay off such debts.

Japan’s public debt of 200% of GDP is quoted in rhetoric about public debt, but it is forgotten that Japan is a creditor nation and hence not always great to compare it with other nations.

Another recent article by Goodhart starts off well:

There are two main problems to be faced in any attempt to improve the architecture of international macro‐economic and financial oversight. The first is structural; the second is analytical. The first difficulty resides in the discord between having a system of national sovereignty at the same time as an international market economy, …

Will The Incredible Lacuna Be Rectified?

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In 1992, Wynne Godley wrote a terrific London Review of Books article Maastricht And All That pinpointing the exact defect in the Maastricht Treaty. He wrote about an “incredible lacuna”:

… The incredible lacuna in the Maastricht programme is that, while it contains a blueprint for the establishment and modus operandi of an independent central bank, there is no blueprint whatever of the analogue, in Community terms, of a central government …

The New York Times has Wolfgang Schäuble, the German federal minister of finance, for the Saturday Profile this weekend.

According to the article he will push for a treaty change:

MR. SCHÄUBLE said the German government would propose treaty changes at the summit of European leaders in Brussels on Dec. 9 that would move Europe closer to the centralized fiscal government that the currency zone has lacked. The ultimate goal, Mr. Schäuble says, is a political union with a European president directly elected by the people.

and also that

He sees the turmoil as not an obstacle but a necessity. “We can only achieve a political union if we have a crisis,” Mr. Schäuble said.

Schäuble had penned an Opinion piece on the Financial Times, a couple of months ago

where he wrote

Hence my unease when some politicians and economists call on the eurozone to take a sudden leap into fiscal union and joint liability. Not only would such a step fail to durably solve the crisis by addressing only its most superficial symptoms, but it could make it worse in the medium term by removing a key incentive for the weaker members to forge ahead with much-needed reforms. It would also go against the very nature of European integration.

Wolfgang Schäuble, failed to see the crisis coming, but he has a point – it is the other side of the debate to the recent calls to the European Central Bank to act as a lender of the last resort to national euro area governments. Mervyn King made a similar point recently. Schäuble, however wants to manufacture a crisis to force national governments to implement reforms while he gives a blueprint for increasing the powers of the European Parliament. A bit sadist isn’t it?

Seems it is too late! There is a new buzz phrase in financial markets: “redenomination risk”.

Update

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard calls Schäuble the most dangerous man in the world 🙂

German finance minister Wolfgang Schauble – the most dangerous man in the world – is imposing a reactionary policy of synchronized tightening on the whole eurozone through the EU institutions, invoking a doctrine of “expansionary fiscal contractions” that has no record of success without offsetting monetary and exchange stimulus. What is abject is that EU bodies should acquiesce in this primitive dogma.

Financial Crisis And Flow Of Funds

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Marc Lavoie forwarded me the European Central Bank’s Monthly Bulletin, October 2011 which has a section on TARGET2 and the European monetary system. I have had good discussions with him on emails to nail the TARGET2 operations so it is good to see the conclusions being verified in publications. I am waiting to write a long blog post on TARGET2 and trying to collect sources I can quote/link and I came across a section on flow of funds in the same article. It appears on page 99 (page 100 of the pdf) and is titled The Financial Crisis In The Light Of Euro Area Accounts: A Flow-Of-Funds Perspective. 

The article has this chart which will be very familiar to readers because it has been in the Levy Institute’s Strategic Prospects since many years.

There are some differences in terminologies. Wynne Godley (and Francis Cripps) started using NAFA (Net Accumulation/Acquisition of Financial Assets) to denote a sector’s surplus in the 1970s and Levy Institute has continued using this. Modern national accountants use Net Lending (by a sector) and split this into Net Acquisition of Financial Assets and Net Incurrence/Acquisition/Increase of/of/in Liabilities and take the difference. Levy’s authors also use Net Lending but as Net Lending to a Sector – e.g., Net Lending to Households.

The article also presents this table (termed Transactions Flow Matrix by Wynne Godley – his greatest trick)

(click to enlarge)

and has this description:

The sectoral accounts present the accounts of institutional sectors in a coherent and integrated way, linking – similar to the way in which profit and loss, cash flows and balance sheet statements are linked in business accounting  – uses/expenditure, resources/revenue, financial flows and their accumulation into balance sheets from one period to the next.To this effect, all units in the economy are classified in one of the four institutional sectors (i.e. households, non-financial corporations, financial corporations and general government). Their accounts are presented using identical classifications and accounting rules (those of ESA 95), in a manner such that each transaction/asset reported by one unit will be symmetrically reported by the counterpart unit (at least in principle). Accordingly, the sectoral accounts present the data with three constraints: each sector must be in balance vertically (e.g. the excess of expenditure on revenue must be equal to financing); all sectors must add up horizontally (e.g. all wages paid by sectors must be earned by households); and transactions in assets/liabilities plus holding gains/losses and other changes in the volume of assets/liabilities must be consistent with changes in balance sheets (stock-flow consistency). The sectoral accounts are commonly presented in a matrix form, with sectors in columns and transactions/instruments in rows, with horizontal and vertical totals adding up (see the example in the table).

The first five rows of the table show the expenditure and revenues of each of the sectors (broken down into types of expenditure/revenue). In row 6, the difference between revenue and expenditure (the surplus/deficit) is shown.

The notions of revenue and expenditure are close to, but generally less encompassing than, the more traditional national account concepts of resources and uses. Income can then be defined as revenue (except capital transfers received) minus expenditure other than final consumption and capital expenditure (capital formation and capital transfers paid). For corporations, income corresponds to retained earnings. Savings is the excess of income over final consumption.

Surpluses/deficits are then associated with transactions in financial assets and liabilities in each sector. This is shown in rows 7 to 10. The bottom part of the table shows the stocks of assets and liabilities, which result from the accumulation of transactions and other flows. This table is extremely simplified (e.g. omitting an explicit presentation of the stock of non-financial assets).

The excess of revenue over expenditure is the net lending/net borrowing (i.e. financial surplus/ deficit), a key indicator of the sectoral accounts. Typically, a household’s revenue will exceed its expenditure. Households are thus providers of net lending to the rest of the economy. Non-financial corporations typically do not cover their expenditure by revenue, as they finance at least part of their non-financial investments by funds from other sectors in addition to internal funds. Non-financial corporations are thus typically net borrowers. Governments are also often net borrowers. If the net lending provided by households is not sufficient to cover the net borrowing of the other sectors, the economy as a whole has a net borrowing position vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Deviations from this typical constellation were apparent in several euro area countries before the crisis, in particular, with extremely elevated residential investment that resulted in households becoming net borrowers (as has been the case in the United States).

The adding-up constraints in the accounts require that any (ex ante) increase in the financial balance of one sector is matched by a reduction in the financial balances of other sectors. The accounting framework does not, however, indicate by which mechanism this reduction will be brought about, or which mechanisms are at play. The EAA makes it possible to track changes in net lending in the different sectors of the economy. It also specifies the financial instruments affected and shows how the transactions and valuation changes leave a lasting effect on the balance sheets of the sectors.

The article is worth a read.

The Bank of England also had a similar article recently but before: Growing Fragilities – Balance Sheets In The Great Moderation by Richard Barwell and Oliver Burrows and quotes the work of G&L (Godley and Lavoie). It also has a similar matrix as the ECB’s article.

(click to enlarge)

Godley and Lavoie build a series of closed accounting frameworks based on the system of National Accounts, which encompass: the standard national income flows, such as wages and consumption; the counterpart financing flows, such as bank loans and deposits; and stocks of physical and financial assets and liabilities. This framework lends itself to representation in a set of matrices. The first matrix captures flow variables (Table A.1). The columns represent the sectors of the economy and the rows represent the markets in which they interact. The matrix has two important properties. Each sector’s resources and uses columns provide their budget constraint — the sums must equal to ensure that all funds they receive are accounted for. And each row must also sum to zero, to ensure that each market clears — that is, the supply of a particular asset must be matched by purchases of that asset, to ensure that no funds go astray.

The table can usefully be split in two, with the top half covering the standard income and expenditure flows and the bottom half covering financing flows. The two halves of the table are linked together by each sector’s ‘net lending balance’, or ‘financial surplus’. The net lending balance can be used to summarise each sector’s income and expenditure flows as the difference between the amount the sector spends on consumption and physical investment and the amount that it receives in income. This difference must be met by financing flows — either borrowing or the sale of financial assets. In national accounts terminology, a sector’s net lending balance (NL) must equal its net acquisition of financial assets (NAFA) less its net acquisition of liabilities (NAFL). Across sectors, the net lending balances have to sum to zero, as all funds borrowed by one sector must ultimately come from another.

While it is useful to split the table for accounting purposes into income and expenditure flows and financing flows, it is important to note that the acquisition of financial assets and liabilities is not necessarily determined purely by imbalances between income and desired expenditure. Sectoral balance sheets can adjust for other reasons. Agents may want to borrow money to purchase assets, simultaneously acquiring financial assets and liabilities. And on occasion agents may want to shrink the size of their balance sheets, selling off financial assets to pay off financial liabilities. Finally, some agents may default on their debt obligations, which will involve a revision in the financial assets and liabilities of both debtor and creditor. At an aggregate level, simultaneous expansion of a sector’s assets and liabilities invariably represents one set of underlying agents taking on assets whilst the other takes on liabilities. The household sector provides an important example. If a young household takes a mortgage to buy a house from an old household, the sector in aggregate simultaneously acquires a liability (the young household’s mortgage) and an asset (the deposit created for the young household to pay to the old household).

All of these activities — leveraging up, deleveraging and default — involve NAFA and NAFL moving in lockstep. The net lending identity still holds: the gap between income and expenditure determines the difference between NAFA and NAFL. But the absolute size of the NAFA and NAFL flows is determined by agents’ actions in financial markets. The second table captures the balance sheet positions of each sector. The balance sheet matrix is updated over time using data on the acquisition of assets and liabilities from the transaction flows matrix, and revaluation effects to asset positions. Proceeding in this manner, balance sheets always balance across sectors, flows of funds are always accounted for over time and the impact of flows of funds on balance sheets is always recorded.

Again, good article!

The first time a proper transactions flow matrix appeared was in a 1996 Levy institute paper by Wynne Godley:  Money, Finance And National Income Determination – An Integrated Approach.

(click to enlarge)

James Tobin et al. had something similar – almost but not quite in A Model Of US Financial And Nonfinancial Economic Behavior :

(click to enlarge)

Curried EMU: Wynne Godley From 1997

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(Click the newspaper clip to enlarge)

… Currie also thinks what happens after Emu is a question that can be shelved: ‘Adopting the single currency means, by definition, surrendering control over monetary policy, but no further loss of national sovereignty would necessarily be bound to follow. Europe’s governments may well choose that course. Or they may choose otherwise.’ I don’t think this covers the ground.

First of all, if a government stops having its own currency, it doesn’t give up just ‘control over monetary policy’ as normally understood; its spending powers also become constrained in an entirely new way. If a government does not have its own central bank on which it can draw checks freely, its expenditure can be financed only by borrowing in the open market in competition with business firms, and this may prove excessively expensive or even impossible, particularly under ‘conditions of extreme emergency’.

Maastricht And All That

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Wynne Godley wrote an article in the London Review of Books in 1992 commenting on how and why the idea of a European Monetary Union is doomed to fail. LRB today removed the “paywall” so that the article is accessible to everyone.

click to view the tweet on Twitter

FT Alphaville also wrote on this.

Commonsense Route To A Common Europe

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If you read my posts or look at the “Tag Cloud” on the right, you will recognize what a big fan of Wynne Godley I am :-).

Above is an Observer article from 1991. Click the newspaper clip to enlarge.

Quoting from the end of the article:

If we are to proceed creatively towards EMU, it is essential to break out of the vicious circle of ‘negative integration’— the process by which power is progressively removed from individual governments without there being any positive, organic, all-European alternative to transcend it. The nightmare is that the whole country, not just the countryside becomes at best a prairie, at worst a derelict area.

Separated at Birth? The Twin Budget and Trade Balances

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The International Monetary Fund, IMF has one full chapter devoted to the subject of “twin deficits” in their latest issue of World Economic Outlook. The subject of “twin deficits” is full of complications and can invoke the deepest emotions from economists. Naively, the argument goes as follows: The “three financial balances” identity can be written as

NAFA = DEF + BP

where NAFA, DEF and BP stand for the Net Acquisition of Financial Assets of the private sector, Government Deficit, and the current Balance of International Payments. From the above, if the government deficit increases, for a constant NAFA (rather a constant NAFA/GDP), an increase in DEF causes BP to reduce, i.e., reduces the current account balance or causes the current account deficit to increase.

Now, this is hardly the best way to put it – because it is mistaking an accounting identity for a behavioural relationship. For example, in conjecturing, one is implicitly assuming that the budget deficit is exogenous or fixed by the government. It is then argued that to reduce the current account deficit (or BP with a minus sign), the government should cut its budget deficit.

There is some truth to “twin deficits”, in my opinion. A lot actually! However, conclusions from any analysis need to be studied in a proper framework and stock-flow coherent macroeconomics is the only way to do this. Money is automatically endogenous in “SFC” models – it cannot be otherwise.

The government sets its fiscal policy or fiscal stance. This can be approximated to be G/θ, where G is for government expenditures and θ is the tax rate (as opposed to total taxes). The budget deficit is out of the control of the government and is dependent among other things, the private sector propensity to consume, the exports and imports. Assuming exports remain constant, relaxing the fiscal stance (i.e., an increase of G/θ) leads to an increase in domestic demand, ceteris paribus. An increase in demand leads to an increase in imports. (If people have higher incomes, they will purchase more imported products). This leads to the widening of the current account deficit and hence through the sectoral balances identity a widening of the budget deficit.

Various things can be said about what is written in the last paragraph. Take the case when ceteris is not paribus. An increase in the propensity to save (i.e., a decrease in propensity to consume) can lead to a higher NAFA and DEF  and increasing BP (as a result of lower domestic demand and hence lower imports).

Come back to ceteris paribus: assume that demand abroad has increased for some reason. This could be due to an increase in the fiscal stance of the foreign government or a private sector led credit expansion abroad. This will lead to an increase in exports for the country we are discussing. So in such a scenario, an increase in the fiscal stance – up to some limit – will not lead to a widening of CAD, i.e., decrease in BP.

Wynne Godley put it best in a Levy article in 1995 (always perfect with his wording):

Refuting the “Saving is Too Low” Argument 

It is sometimes held that, in the words of the Economist (May 27. 1995, p. 18), “America’s current account deficit is enormous because its citizens save so little and its government spends too much.” The basis for this proposition is the accounting identity that says that the private sector’s surplus of saving over investment is always equal to the government’s deficit plus (or minus) the current account surplus (or deficit). As this relationship invariably holds by the laws of logic, it can be said with certainty that if private saving were to increase given the budget deficit or if the budget deficit were to be reduced given private saving, the current account balance would be found to have improved by an exactly equal amount. But an accounting identity, though useful as a basis for consistent thinking about the problem can tell us nothing about why anything happens. In my view, while it is true by the laws of logic that the current balance of payments always equals the public deficit less the private financial surplus, the only causal relationship linking the balances (given trade propensities) operates through changes in the level of output at home and abroad. Thus a spontaneous increase in household saving or a spontaneous reduction in the budget deficit (say, as a result of cuts in public expenditure) would bring about an improvement in the external deficit only because either would induce a fall in total demand and output, with lower imports as a consequence.

How is protectionism related to all this? When nations face severe balance of payments issues, they are forced to deflate demand in order to bring the balance of payments at sustainable levels. If that doesn’t work either, nations may try to directly reduce imports. This works via reducing the propensity to import and hence imports. However, it is difficult to take such a step because it can lead to retaliation. As John Maynard Keynes once put it:

During most of the period in which the modern world has been evolved … the failure to solve this problem has been a major cause of impoverishment and social discontent and even of wars and revolutions.

i.e., the failure to resolve the balance of payments problem. The only way to peacefully resolve this issue is by working toward a solution which is good for all. Even the Bank of England (and Mervyn King) has realized this. Else we will just have a long period of low demand and high unemployment, leading to social unrest. More on that some other time.

[Update, 3 Jan 2012: Fixed some errors]